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INTRODUCTION 
In 1914 a New York court decided the seminal case that estab-
lished an individual’s right to informed consent.1  The court opined 
that “[e]very human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body.”2  Almost a century 
later, however, a New York court effectively denied enforcement of 
that right to every human being outside of the United States when it 
declined to find jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute for a foreign 
violation of informed consent.3  A 2005 film, The Constant Gardener, 
heightened public awareness of international violations of informed 
consent by exposing questionable tuberculosis experiments con-
ducted on nonconsenting, HIV-infected patients in Africa and reveal-
ing the inability of these patients to escape experimentation in clinical 
trials if they wished to maintain later access to basic medical care.4  
With an increased demand for clinical trials to support the appropri-
1 Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92 (N.Y. 1914), overruled on other 
grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9 (N.Y. 1957). 
2 Id. at 93 (emphasis added). 
3 See infra Part II.A (discussing the Trovan Case, in which a New York court dis-
missed the claims of Nigerian clinical trial participants under the Alien Tort Statute, 
finding that it lacked a sufficient basis to evaluate the alleged harms suffered by the 
plaintiffs). 
4 THE CONSTANT GARDENER (Focus Features 2005). 
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ateness of drugs, the number of clinical trials in developing countries5 
is likely to increase.6  The above examples demonstrate the particular 
vulnerability of human subjects in developing countries, and the need 
for more rigorous protection of their rights in the international con-
text. 
Notwithstanding recent circumstances in both fact and film, in-
ternational consensus demands certain minimum protections for hu-
man subjects involved in research and considers deviation from those 
protections to be violations of human rights.  Several international in-
struments describe protections for human subjects involved in clinical 
trials.  These instruments, however, provide no formal remedy for 
harms resulting from a breach of the universal principles governing 
research ethics, including the right to informed consent.  Some indi-
vidual countries have attempted to formalize protections through 
regulatory measures designed to incentivize conduct consistent with 
the mandates of ethically acceptable research.7  Yet inconsistent or 
nonexistent enforcement of these measures again leaves human sub-
jects without any real protection.  The inadequacy of judicial stan-
dards and regulatory enforcement in many developing countries has 
prompted human research participants to explore other means of en-
forcing their right to informed consent. 
5 This Comment does not attempt to provide an official definition of the term 
“developing country,” as the term is used with variable definitions within the legal, 
medical, and ethical literature.  Instead, this Comment uses the terms “developing 
country,” “developing nation,” “third world country,” and “third world nation” inter-
changeably.  Each term includes those countries that, due to low incomes and marked 
lack of access to medical attention and treatment options, are dominantly populated 
by individuals vulnerable to exploitation in the context of human subject research.  
Such countries may fall under the low- and middle-income categories of traditional 
classifications.  See The World Bank, Country Classification, http://www.worldbank.org 
(follow “Countries” hyperlink; then follow “Data” hyperlink; then follow “Country 
Classification” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) (defining groups of countries ac-
cording to gross national income per capita). 
6 See infra Part I.A-B (discussing incentives for conducting clinical research in de-
veloping countries). 
7 See infra Part III.A (describing regulations promulgated by Nuremberg Tribu-
nals, the World Medical Association, the Council for International Organizations of 
Medical Sciences, and the International Conference on Harmonisation). 
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The Alien Tort Statute (ATS)8 provides a viable option for these 
individuals, although it has not yet been successfully employed for 
such a purpose.9  This Comment argues that the ATS, in fact, provides 
the most promising remedy for an individual whose right to informed 
consent has been violated in a clinical trial conducted in a developing 
country.  While there are significant barriers to succeeding on any 
ATS claim, these barriers are not unique to the situation considered 
here and should not preclude a plaintiff from bringing an action un-
der the ATS. 
Part I examines the increasing globalization of clinical trials, and 
the need to protect human participants in these research endeavors.  
Part II describes the ATS and explores its reach over international 
torts after the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain in 2004.10  This decision restrained the growing applicability 
of the ATS to novel situations involving violations of human rights.  
Specifically, the Sosa Court addressed whether the ATS provided only 
a jurisdictional basis for a suit in a U.S. federal court or, more broadly, 
whether it permitted courts to establish a new cause of action for vio-
lations of international law.11  In deciding that the statute conferred 
jurisdiction only, the Sosa decision has been read to sharply limit any 
8 Alien’s Action for Tort, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (providing that “[t]he district 
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or by a treaty of the United States”).  The 
legal literature refers to this law as either the Alien Tort Statute (ATS) or the Alien 
Tort Claims Act (ATCA).  This Comment uses Alien Tort Statute and ATS for the re-
mainder of the discussion. 
9 Because this Comment examines the viability of remedy under the ATS in 
United States courts, it focuses on the United States as the “developed nation,” in con-
trast to the “developing nation” in which research may be conducted.  This does not 
necessarily mean that the United States has the most developed or protective standards 
for human subjects, or that no developing country offers protection to human subjects.  
Furthermore, in focusing this discussion on the viability of a legal remedy under the 
ATS, this Comment specifically discusses recognition of the norm of informed consent.  
This is not to suggest that informed consent is the only ethical norm that merits con-
cern in conducting international research.  Certainly the potential for subject exploita-
tion and unfair practices may arise in many aspects of international research, such as 
negotiating post-trial access to promising remedies for illness.  The focus remains on 
informed consent because it is so strongly regarded as an imperative in any human 
subjects research that it fulfills the specificity required for an actionable violation un-
der the ATS.  See infra Part III.B-C (discussing informed consent as an element of cus-
tomary international law). 
10 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
11 See id. at 712 (stating that, in Sosa, the respondent, Alvarez-Machain, challenged 
the claim that the ATS “does no more than vest federal courts with jurisdiction, neither 
creating nor authorizing the courts to recognize any particular right of action”). 
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claims brought under it that would expand the statute’s original ap-
plicability.12  However, the Court left room for application to a limited 
body of judge-made federal common law that met the standard set by 
Sosa.  Part III discusses in detail the international law that governs the 
conduct of clinical trials.  It illustrates the intended breadth of inter-
national human subjects protections and asserts that, despite variation 
in approaches, the principle of informed consent emerges from these 
protections as a universally accepted prerequisite for human subject 
participation in ethically acceptable medical experimentation.13  This 
Comment concludes that such substantial and consistent international 
consensus demanding informed consent in the context of medical 
experimentation raises the status of the doctrine to a norm of custom-
ary international law.  Because the Sosa decision leaves room for rec-
ognition of such norms under the federal common law, violations of 
informed consent remain actionable under the ATS, even in the re-
strictive post-Sosa period. 
I.  CLINICAL TRIALS MOVE ABROAD—BUT HUMAN SUBJECTS 
PROTECTIONS DO NOT FOLLOW 
The number of clinical trials conducted abroad continues to 
rise.14  The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) “oversees signifi-
cantly more foreign research than it did 10 years ago”;15 however, the 
“FDA cannot assure the same level of human subject protections in 
foreign trials as domestic ones.”16  The lack of FDA oversight over for-
eign trials may in fact explain the movement of clinical trials to for-
12 See generally, Eugene Kontorovich, Implementing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain:  What 
Piracy Reveals About the Limits of the Alien Tort Statute, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 111, 115-
18 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court essentially shut down ATS litigation with 
the Sosa decision). 
13 See infra Part III.A (describing the doctrine of informed consent and detailing 
the references to it in various international instruments). 
14 See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., THE GLOB-
ALIZATION OF CLINICAL TRIALS:  A GROWING CHALLENGE IN PROTECTING HUMAN SUB-
JECTS 6 (2001) [hereinafter OIG GLOBALIZATION REPORT] (noting that the “number 
of foreign clinical investigators conducting drug research under Investigational New 
Drug Applications increased 16-fold” from 1990-1999); see also Ileana Dominguez-
Urban, Harmonization in the Regulation of Pharmaceutical Research and Human Rights:  The 
Need to Think Globally, 30 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 245, 264 (1997) (discussing the FDA’s al-
lowance of foreign clinical data as support for new U.S. drug applications under cer-
tain circumstances, and suggesting that this circumstance has contributed to the rising 
number of foreign clinical trials). 
15 OIG GLOBALIZATION REPORT, supra note 14, at 6. 
16 Id. at 12. 
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eign locations.  The FDA implemented a change in its rules in 1994, 
permitting foreign research data to support applications for the ap-
proval of new drugs in the United States.17  The number of clinical tri-
als began increasing dramatically, as researchers now could utilize a 
previously untapped resource—research subjects abroad.  Under the 
regulations, 
 
[a]n application based solely on foreign clinical data meeting U.S. crite-
ria for marketing approval may be approved if:  (1) The foreign data are 
applicable to the U.S. population and U.S. medical practice; (2) the 
studies have been performed by clinical investigators of recognized 
competence; and (3) the data may be considered valid without the need for an 
on-site inspection by FDA . . . .
18
Through this amendment, the FDA specifically required investigators 
to have the capacity to certify the validity of foreign data without di-
rect FDA oversight to support a U.S. drug application.  The amended 
regulations also implied that the FDA would rely on data that it had 
not itself monitored.  The increase in the number of foreign trials 
thus appears to be one result of, or is at least facilitated by, a move to-
ward relaxed standards for the acceptance of foreign data.  The sig-
nificant benefits attached to conducting trials in developing countries 
continue to lead to an increasing amount of research conducted 
abroad.19  Absent FDA oversight, however, as more trials move out of 
the United States—and away from domestic protections for human 
subjects—the lack of global enforcement of human subjects protec-
tions becomes more problematic. 
A.  Utility of Extraterritorial Research to Multinational Corporations 
Multinational corporations have many reasons to conduct clinical 
trials in developing countries.20  The majority of research done in de-
17 21 C.F.R. § 314.106(b)(1) (1994); see also William DuBois, Note, New Drug Re-
search, The Extraterritorial Application of FDA Regulations, and the Need for International Co-
operation, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 161, 167 (2003) (commenting on how these 1994 
amendments “liberalized” the FDA rules regarding foreign data). 
18 21 C.F.R. § 314.106(b) (2005) (emphasis added). 
19 See RUTH MACKLIN, DOUBLE STANDARDS IN MEDICAL RESEARCH IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 6-9 (2004) (enumerating both scientific and financial benefits of research-
ing abroad). 
20 This discussion focuses predominantly on research conducted by the private 
sector, and specifically by multinational corporations, because they are the largest 
category of investigators conducting foreign research.  Focusing on private sector re-
search also permits a more rigorous analysis of the state action requirement under the 
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veloping countries typically aims to expand knowledge about a drug.  
Corporations then can use this knowledge to generate gains not in-
tended for developing countries.21  One industry researcher stated 
that “doing clinical trials in the third world sometimes may be moti-
vated by a variety of reasons.  In general, the [primary reasons are] ac-
cess to the patient in large numbers and [at] a faster rate.  And some-
times the third argument, nevertheless, is also at a cheaper price.”22  
This explanation reflects two general categories of factors motivating 
researchers abroad:  study validity (by expanding the size and diversity 
of the study population) and reduced cost (often by removing regula-
tions imposed by developed countries).23
Researchers receive several study-related benefits from conducting 
clinical trials in developing nations.  Investigators can conduct re-
search on diseases and populations that are more diverse than those 
to which they have access in the United States.24  In addition, because 
individuals in many countries lack access to adequate treatment, trials 
ATS.  The state action element operates to make an ATS violation more difficult for a 
plaintiff to prove.  As a result, if an argument for liability can succeed against a private 
actor, such as an industry researcher, then recovery against public or expressly state 
actors logically follows.  See infra Part III.D.1 (discussing the state action requirement of 
the Sosa standard). 
21 Nancy Kass & Adnan A. Hyder, Attitudes and Experiences of U.S. and Developing 
Country Investigators Regarding U.S. Human Subjects Regulations, in 2 ETHICAL AND POLICY 
ISSUES IN INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH:  CLINICAL TRIALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES B-1, 
B-31 to B-32 (2001) (relating responses from members of a focus group, and quoting 
an unnamed researcher in a pharmaceutical company, who added that “the pharma-
ceutical industry is a profitable business . . . not a charitable business”). 
22 Id. 
23 Recall that individual developed or developing countries may fall short of or 
exceed these trends respectively.  See supra note 5.  Of course, there are additional rea-
sons that motivate researchers to conduct studies abroad; the focus here is on those 
which increase the vulnerability of participants to violations of human subjects protec-
tions. 
24 Many diseases in developing countries have been virtually eradicated in devel-
oped countries.  By going abroad, investigators are able to see a greater variety of  
diseases, and can learn about the effectiveness of treatments for those diseases.   
For example, investigators can learn about drug-resistant forms of diseases that are al-
most exclusively found in developing countries, such as malaria and tuberculosis.   
See MEDECINS SANS FRONTIERES, DRUGS FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES WORKING GROUP,  
ADDRESSING THE CRISIS IN RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT FOR NEGLECTED DISEASES  
1 (2006), http://www.accessmed-msf.org/documents/breifR&Djan2006.doc (listing 
these conditions as “neglected” in developing countries, due to lack of access to treat-
ments).  Unfortunately, research frequently is lacking for those diseases which do not 
at all affect wealthier countries.  Id.  More commonly, research is done in developing 
countries because, when abroad, investigators can see diseases at a different point in 
the course of the illness.  See infra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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may be conducted on large numbers of individuals with conditions 
that, untreated, have progressed further along in the natural course of 
the disease.25  One industry representative summarized:  “You want pa-
tients with no other disease states and no other treatments.  Then you 
can say relatively clearly that whatever happens to those patients is 
from the drug.”26  Indeed, research on so-called “naïve” subjects27 gen-
erates more reliable data.  Being able to conduct research on such 
populations also permits investigators to draw conclusions about the 
effectiveness of a treatment for more severe manifestations of a dis-
ease.  These conclusions may then be used domestically in a patient 
who has not sought early treatment for a condition or for whom early 
treatment has failed.  Often, due to a fragile medical state, these indi-
viduals would be excluded from domestic trials; in a developing coun-
try, however, they may be permitted or even encouraged to enter a 
trial.  Moreover, the access gap28 creates an incentive for researchers 
to do research in developing countries, where they can conduct pla-
cebo control trials rather than active control trials on subjects.29  The 
FDA prefers placebo controls,30 and the individuals or drug approval 
25 See MACKLIN, supra note 19, at 6-7 (asserting that a major source of research sub-
jects may be found in developing countries where patients are “exposed to fewer other 
drugs than . . . patients in industrialized countries”); see also OIG GLOBALIZATION RE-
PORT, supra note 14, at 8 (“Sponsors report using emerging sites for their research to 
gain access to large numbers of subjects with a particular disease, especially those that 
are ‘naïve subjects’ (i.e., have not been treated for the disease being studied), and to 
obtain data on different racial or ethnic groups.”); Sonia Shah, Globalizing Clinical Re-
search:  Big Pharma Tries Out First World Drugs on Unsuspecting Third World Patients, THE 
NATION, July 1, 2002, at 23, 23-24 (noting that individuals in developing countries fre-
quently are not on medications that could skew the results of a drug trial and therefore 
can provide better data for researchers). 
26 MACKLIN, supra note 19, at 7 (citing Shah, supra note 25, at 23 (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
27 See id. (defining untreated subjects as “naïve”). 
28 The difference between access to treatment in developing countries and devel-
oped countries has been referred to as the “access gap,” where effective treatments for 
a particular condition are known, but not available in a specific area, usually a develop-
ing country.  See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities:  An Open 
Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1037 (2005) 
(defining the “access gap” as “the systematic inability of individuals in developing 
countries to obtain existing medicines”). 
29 In placebo control trials, investigators compare a drug’s effectiveness to an inac-
tive preparation of the drug, while in active control trials, the relevant comparison is 
between the study drug and an active drug that is the known standard of care for a par-
ticular condition.  See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(i), (iv) (2005) (defining placebo and 
active control trials, and identifying each as a valid method of assessing a drug’s effect). 
30 See  U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., FDA Comm. for Drug Eval. & Re-
search, Advanced Scientific Education Seminar Series:  The Use of Placebos in Clinical 
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entities making determinations about a drug’s promise for treating a 
particular disease more highly prize placebo control trials because 
they generate more accurate statements about the effectiveness of a 
drug.31  However, such trials often cannot be conducted in developed 
countries.32
The relaxed regulatory environment found in many developing 
countries also accounts for an increase in clinical trials abroad.33  For 
the multinational corporation, the developing country imposes and 
enforces fewer affirmative duties to protect research subjects than 
countries in the developed world.  There are two principle reasons for 
this.  First, the policies designed to protect human subjects who par-
ticipate in clinical trials in a developed country often will not reach in-
vestigators’ conduct in foreign clinical trials, even if the investigators 
come from the developed country.34  Yet investigators may use data 
Trials and the Ethics of the Use of Placebos (Apr. 21, 1999), available at http:// 
www.fda.gov/cder/foi/special/99/case-trans-42199.txt (suggesting that placebo con-
trol trials are the most scientifically valid and thus offer the most rigorous support for a 
drug’s approval). 
31 In addition to the confounding effects that other drugs can have on a study’s 
outcome, the requirement in the United States for active control studies when a dis-
ease is treatable also reduces the likelihood that new drugs will be tested in the United 
States.  The U.S. requirement for active control studies may at first appear inconsistent 
with the FDA’s preference for placebo-controlled studies.  See supra note 30.  Although 
placebo-controlled trials do offer potentially better data from a scientific standpoint, 
the FDA recognizes that failure to provide care when a known treatment is available 
places patients at risk.  The requirement for active control trials removes that risk by 
permitting placebo trials only when no active trial treatment is available.  This ten-
sion—to obtain the most rigorous data possible on the one hand and to provide active 
control trials when treatment is available on the other—can lead researchers to seek 
clinical trial locations outside of the U.S., where such restrictions may not exist.  Re-
searchers often select developing countries, typically for one of two reasons:  either 
authorities do not place restrictions on clinical trials or, more commonly, the lack of 
access to treatment removes the possibility of an active control study. 
32 Placebos may not be used when such use would put the patient at risk.  See 21 
C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(iv) (2005) (noting that an active control should be used when 
the “administration of placebo . . . would be contrary to the interest of the patient”).  A 
known “standard of care” exists when medical providers are aware of an effective 
treatment for a particular condition.  In the United States, the presence of such a 
known standard of care precludes the use of placebo controls.  See Stuart L. Nightin-
gale, Challenges in Human Subject Protection, 50 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 493, 498 (1995) (de-
scribing the appropriate use of placebo controls in trials). 
33 See OIG GLOBALIZATION REPORT, supra note 14, at 15 (reporting regulatory de-
ficiencies in foreign oversight). 
34 For example, when United States-based investigators conduct research in for-
eign countries, guidelines governing domestic research do not extend to their conduct 
abroad.  See id. at 12-16 (discussing the lack of FDA oversight and lack of preparedness 
of foreign oversight institutions). 
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obtained from foreign studies to support a drug application submitted 
for FDA approval.  To obtain FDA approval of a drug and rights for 
the marketing of that drug in the United States, investigators must 
submit a New Drug Application (NDA) to the FDA.35  With this appli-
cation, researchers also must submit data from studies which support 
the NDA.36  Acceptable studies include research conducted through 
one of two approaches.  In the first, the private actor chooses initially 
to file an Investigational New Drug Application (IND) with the FDA, 
bringing the investigator, regardless of the location of the research, under 
the federal regulations governing the conduct of research in the 
United States.37  Such research is subject to informed consent provi-
sions applicable to research conducted within the United States it-
self.38  If a private actor chooses not to submit an IND and, conse-
quently, to avoid FDA procedural regulations on its research, in order 
to have its studies accepted as valid it must meet other ethical guide-
lines.  In this situation, the private actor must abide by either the 
guidelines specified in the Declaration of Helsinki or the protections 
provided by regulations in place in the country in which the research 
is being conducted, whichever option provides greater protection to 
study participants.39
35 Id. at 5. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 See 45 C.F.R. § 46.111 (2005) (stipulating that “[i]nformed consent will be 
sought from each prospective subject or the subject’s legally authorized representative, 
in accordance with, and to the extent required by § 46.116. . . . Informed consent will 
be appropriately documented, in accordance with, and to the extent required by  
§ 46.117”); see also Id. § 46.116 (defining the basic requirements for informed consent); 
Id. § 46.117 (providing directions for documentation of informed consent). 
39 OIG GLOBALIZATION REPORT, supra note 14, at 5; see also 21 C.F.R.  
§ 312.120(5)(c)(1) (2005) (“Foreign clinical research is required to have been con-
ducted in accordance with the ethical principles stated in the ‘Declaration of Helsinki’ 
. . . or the laws and regulations of the country in which the research was conducted, 
whichever represents the greater protection of the individual.”).  Federal regulations 
also note that the “FDA accepts [foreign] studies provided they are well designed, well 
conducted, performed by qualified investigators, and conducted in accordance with 
ethical principles acceptable to the world community.”  21 C.F.R. § 312.120(a) (2005) 
(emphasis added).  The Declaration of Helsinki, by FDA standards, therefore repre-
sents the minimum required by the world community.  See infra Part III.A.2 (discussing 
the Declaration of Helsinki’s role in the international context).  In countries that ac-
cept the International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH) Guidelines, those re-
quirements represent the minimum necessary protections, because they are thought to 
confer stronger protection than the Declaration of Helsinki.  See OIG GLOBALIZATION 
REPORT, supra note 14, at 5 & 44 n.11 (stating that the ICH Guidelines “are more ex-
plicit than the Declaration of Helsinki” and therefore are a “higher standard for pro-
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Second, developing countries themselves often provide much less 
protection to human subjects than developed countries; they there-
fore lack the infrastructure needed to enforce the more stringent pro-
visions imposed on researchers in developed countries.40  This lack of 
local government oversight permits investigators in developing coun-
tries to conduct trials more quickly, and at a lower cost per patient-
subject, by removing much of the procedural delay.41  Such incentives 
will continue to drive researchers toward foreign research. 
B.  Utility of Medical Research to Developing Countries 
Not only do various factors motivate both public and private re-
searchers to pursue foreign research sites, but developing countries 
also openly welcome foreign researchers.42  Inhabitants of developing 
countries often face epidemics of diseases that are either eradicated or 
adequately treated in developed countries.43  The access gap in many 
developing countries, however, leaves these inhabitants desperate for 
an opportunity to obtain medication for their diseases.44  These indi-
viduals are therefore disproportionately more likely to enroll in clini-
cal trials than individuals in developed countries.  The majority can-
not afford to purchase the medications known to be effective for 
treating their conditions, and enrollment in a clinical trial offers the 
tecting subjects”).  This may reflect a trend toward greater recognition of ICH Guide-
lines.  See infra notes 55, 144 (commenting on shifts to the ICH Guidelines in the 
United States and in Switzerland). 
40 See Benjamin Mason Meier, International Protection of Persons Undergoing Medical 
Experimentation:  Protecting the Right of Informed Consent, 20 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 513, 532-
33 (2002) (asserting that poor countries, specifically many African nations, lack legisla-
tive protections for human subjects). 
41 See OIG GLOBALIZATION REPORT, supra note 14, at 8 (“[T]hese sites allow [clini-
cal trial sponsors] to recruit subjects quickly and, therefore, bring their drugs to mar-
ket faster.”). 
42 See Meier, supra note 40, at 532 (“[T]his legislative vacuum [of medical experi-
mentation regulations in foreign countries] is intentional.  While governments of 
these nations are desperate to bring medical research to their dying populations, their 
nations cannot afford such research without subsidies from multinational pharmaceu-
tical corporations.” (footnote omitted)). 
43 See NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, THE ETHICS OF RESEARCH RELATED TO 
HEALTHCARE IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 17 (2002) (explaining that a significant con-
tributing factor to the higher mortality rates in developing countries than in developed 
countries is the much greater presence of communicable diseases in the developing 
world). 
44 See Meier, supra note 40, at 532-33 (discussing developing countries’ inability to 
provide research or medical care to their inhabitants without assistance). 
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potential to receive treatment or an evaluation without cost to the in-
dividual.45
Governments in developing countries are also likely to cooperate 
with investigators, and often their large corporate sponsors, who bring 
relief to public health crises within the countries’ borders.  Because of 
the potential benefits these studies offer, developing countries’ gov-
ernments are generally willing to “rubber stamp” protocols proposed 
by companies wishing to conduct trials, even though adequate precau-
tions may not really be in place to protect research subjects.46
C.  Inadequate Enforcement of an Informed Consent Requirement47  
Permits Exploitation 
Along with the significant incentives of a diversified and naïve sub-
ject population, one of the strongest motivators driving investigators 
to conduct trials in developing countries remains the lack of compe-
tent government or regulatory oversight of their actions.48  The regu-
latory requirements attached to human subjects research conducted 
within the United States can indeed be overwhelming.  These restric-
tions stop questionable research early in the development process.  
Although multiple guidelines for research conducted in the interna-
tional context exist, failure to systematically enforce even minimal 
standards permits the exploitation of human research subjects in de-
veloping nations.  For example, a study examining compliance with 
the “best proven” therapeutic efforts standard of the Declaration of 
Helsinki found that only sixteen percent of studies satisfied the re-
45 See Joe Stephens, Where Profits and Lives Hang in Balance, WASH. POST, Dec. 17, 
2000, at A1 (“Given their poverty and lack of access to decent medical care, . . . 
[h]onestly, did they have a choice?” (quotation marks omitted)). 
46 See Meier supra note 40 at 532-33 (claiming that the lack of protections may re-
sult from foreign governments seizing opportunities that offer access to treatments, 
which the country could not provide in the absence of the clinical trials). 
47 See infra Part III (discussing the applicability of the ATS to informed consent).  I 
want to reemphasize, however, that I do not intend to suggest that lack of informed 
consent is the only concerning violation of human subjects protection in clinical trials 
conducted in developing countries.  For a review of ethical considerations in conduct-
ing trials in developing countries, see generally NUFFIELD COUNCIL ON BIOETHICS, su-
pra note 43; NAT’L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM’N, 1 ETHICAL AND POLICY ISSUES IN IN-
TERNATIONAL RESEARCH:  CLINICAL TRIALS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2001) 
(summarizing an eighteen-month study by the commission concerning ethical issues in 
clinical trials conducted abroad).
48 See supra Part I.A-B (enumerating incentives that motivate investigators to con-
duct research abroad). 
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quirement,49 despite the fact that Helsinki represents the minimum 
standard with respect to international research.50  And yet, eighty-one 
percent of these studies were reviewed by an ethics committee or in-
dependent review board.51  In theory, the role of an ethics committee 
or an independent review board includes monitoring for compliance 
with ethical standards such as the Declaration of Helsinki.  The re-
sults, then, indicate a disconnect between knowledge of and intent to 
comply with ethics standards, evidenced by the high percentage of 
studies with ethics and/or independent review board oversight, and 
the low rate of actual compliance with minimal standards in the inter-
national context, as defined by the Declaration of Helsinki.  The 
study’s authors attribute this difference to the belief that investigators 
and ethics review committees evaluate researchers’ ethical perform-
ance based on local, rather than international standards of care for 
treating a disease.52  Nevertheless, the trials evaluated in this study cre-
ated controversy because of their failure to comply with the Declara-
tion of Helsinki, an international standard.53  The authors posit that 
failure to comply with this international standard occurred not be-
cause the Declaration lacks authority, but because international 
documents provide inadequate guidance on the standard of care to 
offer in resource-poor countries.54  The authors therefore imply that 
the researchers knew of the international standard for “best proven” 
therapeutic efforts, but gave more weight to the locally available level 
of care.  Arguably, holding researchers accountable for this choice not 
to comply with international standards may have been appropriate, 
and even helpful in resolving the uncertainty around the appropriate 
standard for resource-poor countries.  But certainly in the context of 
49 David M. Kent et al., Clinical Trials in Sub-Saharan Africa and Established Standards 
of Care:  A Systematic Review of HIV, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Trials, 292 JAMA 237, 239 
(2004).  The study focused on compliance with the “best proven” therapeutic efforts 
standard of the Declaration of Helsinki, specifically in the context of HIV treatment, 
tuberculosis treatment, and malaria prevention.  Id. at 237-39. 
50 See supra note 39 (discussing minimum ethical standards for research world-
wide). 
51 Kent et al., supra note 49, at 240. 
52 See id. at 240-41 (“A likely explanation for these findings is that investigators who 
design and conduct these studies, and the ethics committees who review and approve 
them, consider trial design in the context of the local level of care rather than the in-
ternational standard of care.”). 
53 See id. at 237.  (“These trials stimulated intense debate since they appeared to 
violate guidelines articulated in the Declaration of Helsinki.”). 
54 See id.  (“Various international guidelines continue to offer conflicting guidance 
on this issue.”). 
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informed consent, which is a much more consistently and broadly de-
fined ethical principle, accountability would be appropriate, as greater 
accountability for researchers would instill greater respect for interna-
tional standards.55
Because individuals responsible for clinical trial oversight in de-
veloping countries continue to approve studies that give inadequate 
attention to participants’ rights in order to reap the benefits of the 
country’s cooperation, human subjects lack any real protection for 
their involvement in the research.56  In this environment, abuses are 
prevalent.57
Several instruments attempt to enumerate the rights of human 
subjects involved in research protocols.  Of these rights, informed 
consent offers the most basic protection.58  Despite the ubiquitous ref-
erences to informed consent in ethical guidelines regarding human 
subjects, numerous violations of the doctrine have been documented.  
A series of Washington Post articles noted many of these alleged 
abuses.59  One account described procedural inadequacies in the con-
sent process conducted with healthy subjects from Estonia who were 
55 See Peter Lurie & Sydney M. Wolfe, Comments on the Draft Health and Human 
Services Inspector General’s Report:  The Globalization of Clinical Trials (OEI-01-00-
00190) (July 5, 2001), reprinted in OIG GLOBALIZATION REPORT, supra note 14, app. D 
at 37, 40-41 (criticizing as weak the FDA’s proposed guidelines for increasing compli-
ance with international standards); Meier, supra note 40, at 534 (“Despite this clear 
adoption of the doctrine of informed consent, [application of this right under] the 
ICCPR ‘is hobbled by weak implementation provisions.’”) quoting M. Cheriff Bassiouni 
et al., An Appraisal of Human Experimentation in International Law and Practice:  The Need 
for International Regulation of Human Experimentation, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
1597, 1657 (1981))); see also Peter Lurie & Dirceu B. Greco, Comment, U.S. Exceptional-
ism Comes to Research Ethics, 365 THE LANCET 1117, 1117-19 (2005) (attacking the FDA 
proposal to replace the Declaration of Helsinki with the ICH Good Clinical Practices as 
only a step away from eviscerating “the standard-bearer for international research eth-
ics [particularly] in the developing world”).  While Lurie and Greco raise a valid ar-
gument regarding the expansive respect for the Declaration of Helsinki, the FDA 
changes do not necessarily eviscerate the value of Helsinki.  See infra note 145 (provid-
ing a counterargument to Lurie and Greco’s criticism). 
56 See, e.g., MACKLIN, supra note 19, at 150 (“If informed consent is the first safe-
guard for the protection of human subjects of research, the second is prior review by a 
properly constituted, independent research ethics committee.”). 
57 See, e.g., id. at 150-52 (recounting two cases, both involving research carried out 
in China, in which ethical violations resulted from a lack of proper oversight). 
58 See infra Part III.A (describing the element of informed consent and its re-
quirements in multiple ethical guidelines). 
59 See MACKLIN, supra note 19, at 133-36 (recounting these newspaper stories). 
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participating in a Swiss study.60  A subject commented that he was 
asked initially to sign a consent form in a language he did not under-
stand; when the consent form was presented in the proper language, 
no one explained its meaning or made sure he understood its con-
tents.61  Another story involved a study in Argentina, in which consent 
forms allegedly were forged.62  In a third study, testing a drug to treat 
oral cancer in India, an investigative committee documented several 
problems, including inadequate consent forms.63  Subjects had not 
been properly informed about the study drug’s risks and benefits, and 
they were not told that participation was voluntary.64  Many believed 
they were being treated rather than participating in an experiment.65
As these examples demonstrate, the current regulatory framework 
fails to recognize the imperative of informed consent in human sub-
jects research, leaving investigators little incentive to change exploitive 
practices.  Without enforcement of ethical standards, investigators 
lack accountability for violations of ethical norms.66  “It is probably 
true that the behavior of profit-making companies will not be changed 
60 Sharon LaFraniere et al., The Dilemma:  Submit or Suffer, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 
2000, at A1. 
61 Id. 
62 See Karen DeYoung & Deborah Nelson, Latin America Is Ripe for Trials, and Fraud:  
Frantic Pace Could Overwhelm Controls, WASH. POST, Dec. 21, 2000, at A1 (describing vio-
lations of the consent process in this study).  After a subject in this study died, the fam-
ily was shown a signed consent form, which they said they did not sign.  Id. 
63 See Scientist Sanctioned Over Drug Trial in India, THE GAZETTE ONLINE, Nov.  
26, 2001, http://www.jhu.edu/~gazette/2001/26nov01/26india.html (describing the 
study and listing ethical abuses by the researcher). 
64 See K.M. Seethi, Clinical Drug Trials:  Bioethics Under Siege, 36 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 
3211, 3212 (2001), available at http://www.frontline.in/fl1817/18170040.htm (detail-
ing the consent process in this study). 
65 See R. Krishnakumar, Drug Trials and Ethics, 18 FRONTLINE:  INDIA’S NAT’L MAG., 
Aug. 18-31, 2001, available at http://www.frontline.in/f11817/18170040.htm (explain-
ing subjects’ belief that they were receiving treatment).  The belief that one is being 
“treated” rather than participating in research is called the “therapeutic misconcep-
tion.”  See MACKLIN, supra note 19, at 131-32 (“[T]he widespread confusion between 
participating in research investigating new, unproven therapies, on the one hand, and 
receiving an established, effective treatment for a health-related condition, on the 
other hand. . . . is known as ‘the therapeutic misconception.’” (quoting Paul S. Appel-
baum et al., The Therapeutic Misconception:  Informed Consent in Psychiatric Research, 5 
INT’L J. L. & PSYCHIATRY 319 passim (1982)); Nancy M. P. King, Experimental Treatment:  
Oxymoron or Aspiration?, HASTINGS CTR. REP., July-Aug. 1995, at 6 passim).  Exploitation 
on the basis of this misconception is not uncommon.  See infra note 142 (describing 
modifications of ethical guidelines due to the prevalence of this misconception). 
66 See Meier, supra note 40, at 535-36 (advocating a need to “solidify the absolute 
nature of the right of free and informed consent”). 
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by issuing or revising ethical guidelines governing research.  But other 
pressures, including international partnerships, and collaborative ef-
forts, have already begun to change the picture of research and its af-
termath in developing countries.”67  While the current environment 
still leaves human subjects vulnerable to exploitation by investigators 
who capitalize on relaxed regulatory frameworks in developing coun-
tries, it is the enforcement of regulations, and not the regulations 
themselves, that is lacking.  Accountability for violations of fundamen-
tal ethical norms promises progress towards the ultimate goal of be-
havioral reform and compensates those who have been exploited un-
der the current practice. 
II.  HUMAN SUBJECTS CAN ENFORCE PROTECTIONS UNDER THE ATS 
An individual subject’s ability to obtain a remedy for violations of 
ethical norms will vary depending on the regulatory framework in 
which the research is conducted.68  Such litigation may occur in the 
countries in which the harm occurred.  Certain countries, however, 
may be unable to perform this function adequately.69  Meanwhile, the 
ATS permits subjects of these countries to seek remedy for these viola-
tions in United States courts.70  This statute, therefore, provides a vi-
able remedy when clinical trials fail to conform to customary interna-
tional law regarding informed consent. 
In 2001, a group of Nigerian plaintiffs attempted to bring suit in 
New York under the ATS for alleged human subjects research abuses 
on this new theory of recovery.71  These plaintiffs attempted to use the 
ATS to enforce international standards for research.  The initial rul-
ing in this case found the ATS inapplicable to the conduct of research 
in clinical trials.72  Examination of ATS jurisprudence, however, sug-
67 MACKLIN, supra note 19, at 31. 
68 See supra Part I.C (commenting on the lack of substantive enforcement of hu-
man subjects protections in many countries). 
69 See Meier, supra note 40, at 535-36 (“International prohibitions are crucial to 
punishing the abuses that cannot be punished by the country in which the physician 
[or investigator] works.”). 
70 See infra Part III.B-C (arguing that the ATS provides a viable outlet for remedy). 
71 Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc. (Trovan Case), No. 01 Civ. 8118, 2005 WL 1870811 
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005). 
72 See id. at *14 (holding that a cause of action for failure to provide informed con-
sent “would expand customary international law far beyond that contemplated by the 
ATS”). 
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gests that the statute remains a viable tool for those harmed in clinical 
trials conducted in violation of customary international law. 
A.  Trovan Litigation as a Test Case 
In the first case to test the ATS’s applicability to research con-
ducted in developing countries, a group of Nigerian plaintiffs brought 
suit on behalf of their children for alleged harms suffered as a result 
of participation in a clinical trial in Nigeria to test a new antibiotic for 
meningitis.73  Plaintiffs in the Trovan Case claimed violations of inter-
national law relating to informed consent.74  They alleged that, follow-
ing an outbreak of bacterial meningitis, measles, and cholera in Kano, 
Nigeria, the defendant pharmaceutical company established a center 
to treat victims of meningitis with an experimental antibiotic.75  In the 
course of “treating” victims, the company was conducting a study of a 
new drug in order to obtain FDA approval for its use in the pediatric 
population.76  Plaintiffs alleged that the company “failed to explain to 
the children’s parents that the proposed treatment was experimental, 
that they could refuse it, or that other organizations offered more 
conventional treatments at the same site free of charge.”77  These fail-
ures, they contended, represented actionable violations under the 
ATS of customary international law regarding informed consent.78  
The plaintiffs specifically argued that the investigators failed to obtain 
valid informed consent as required by customary international law, re-
lying on the Nuremberg Code, Declaration of Helsinki, and Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) for authority.79
The United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York dismissed the action on the grounds of forum non conveniens.80  
73 Id. at *1-2. 
74 Id. at *2. 
75 Id. at *1. 
76 Id. at *2. 
77 Id. (quoting Abdullahi v. Pfizer, Inc., No. 01 CIV. 8118, 2002 WL 31082956, at 
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 17, 2002) (quotation marks omitted)). 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at *6 (“Plaintiffs rely on the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki, 
article 7 of the ICCPR and ‘other norms of international law’ to frame their com-
plaint.”). 
80 Id. at *1 (citing the court’s initial dismissal of the case in Abdullahi, 2002 WL 
31082956).  Forum non conveniens challenges remain an obstacle to securing effective 
relief under the ATS.  See infra notes 207-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
procedural barriers once a claim meets substantive ATS requirements. 
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On appeal to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the case was re-
manded to determine whether there was a suitable alternative fo-
rum.81  On remand, the district court dismissed the case for a second 
time on the grounds of forum non conveniens, but also found that 
the plaintiffs failed to allege an actionable violation under the ATS.82  
In its discussion, the court stated that the Supreme Court ruling in 
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain83 restricted the statute’s reach and excluded 
the claims brought by the plaintiffs.84
On the record provided to it, however, the New York district court 
lacked the information necessary to evaluate the alleged violation un-
der the ATS, given the rigid standard that the U.S. Supreme Court es-
tablished in Sosa.85  To complete a reasoned analysis under Sosa, the 
court would have to consider whether the specific international stan-
dards raised by the plaintiffs individually would permit recovery.  If 
they did not, the court should have considered whether, together, the 
plaintiffs named a right meeting the Sosa criteria for developing the 
federal common law.  Carefully examined, the holding in Sosa, when 
applied to the facts in the Trovan Case, would not exclude litigation of 
the claims alleged.  The ATS, in fact, remains an important tool 
through which courts may create accountability for violations of ethi-
cal norms governing human subjects research. 
B.  Judicial Interpretation of the ATS Leaves Room for  
Expansion of the Federal Common Law 
The history of the ATS gives context to recent judicial interpreta-
tion of the statute.  The Federal Judiciary Act of 1789 included the 
81 Id. at *3.  The plaintiffs asked the court to consider similar proceedings initiated 
in Nigeria, which were twice delayed “for personal reasons” of sitting judges, as evi-
dence of the Nigerian forum’s inadequacy.  Id. at *5 (citing reasons given by Justice 
Haroun Adamu for dismissal of the Nigerian case, Decl. of Adetunji Oyeypido, Atty. 
For Defendant Pfizer, Inc., Ex. A at 170). 
82 Id. at *11-13 (finding that the Nuremberg Code and Declaration of Helsinki 
were nonbinding and that the ICCPR “was not self-executing”).  The court also reiter-
ated the earlier court’s determination that the case failed to meet a forum non conven-
iens challenge; thus, forum non conveniens remained a separate ground upon which 
to dismiss the suit.  Id. at *18.  The court qualified this finding, however, by declaring 
that the defendant would waive any objection to reappearing in U.S. courts if the 
plaintiffs filed their complaint in the alternative forum within sixty days, and if the al-
ternative forum then declined jurisdiction.  Id. 
83 542 U.S. 692 (2004). 
84 Trovan Case, 2005 WL 1870811, at *10-11. 
85 See infra Part II.B (discussing the Sosa standard). 
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ATS, which provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original ju-
risdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in 
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”86  The 
judiciary has witnessed a rapid increase in claims brought under the 
ATS in the past twenty years.87  In interpreting the validity of claims 
under the ATS, courts have addressed several concerns regarding the 
statute’s applicability to evolving international norms. 
The primary debate in ATS litigation involves whether the statute 
is purely jurisdictional or, alternatively, confers both jurisdiction and a 
cause of action for alleged violations of international law.  This debate 
emerged with conflicting interpretations of the statute in Filartiga v. 
Pena-Irala88 and Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic89 and lacked a defini-
tive resolution until the Supreme Court decided Sosa in 2004.  After 
Sosa, the scope of the ATS narrowed greatly, but the Court has not 
foreclosed the possibility of the statute’s application to new causes of 
action in limited circumstances.90  To the contrary, this Comment ar-
gues that despite this narrowing, lack of informed consent is, on its 
merits, an actionable violation.  It concludes that customary interna-
tional law so strongly establishes informed consent as a prerequisite to 
involvement in human subjects research that the ATS, even with the 
Sosa limitations, remains a viable avenue for recovery when research 
proceeds without valid consent.91
86 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000). 
87 See Lorelle Londis, The Corporate Face of the Alien Tort Claims Act:  How an Old 
Statute Mandates a New Understanding of Global Interdependence, 57 ME. L. REV. 141, 150 
(2005) (stating that only twenty-one cases invoked the statute in the first 190 years of 
its existence, while about eighty cases have attempted to apply it in the past twenty-four 
years). 
88 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
89 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
90 See Sosa, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004) (“[C]onsiderations persuade us that the judi-
cial power should be exercised on the understanding that the door is still ajar subject 
to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow class of international norms to-
day.”).  The Court declined to apply Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), 
as a substantive bar to any development of federal common law.  Id.  Beyond meeting 
the jurisdictional requirements under Sosa, however, individuals who attempt to invoke 
the ATS must still overcome several other barriers to successful recovery.  See infra Part 
III.D.  Importantly, none of these barriers would exclude a court from granting jurisdic-
tion in the class of cases that meet the Sosa standard, while failure to demonstrate an 
actionable claim under the ATS would.   
91 This Comment focuses on Sosa’s definition of customary international law, using 
the standard set forth in that case to evaluate the legitimacy of the argument that in-
formed consent is part of the customary international law for the purposes of a claim 
under the ATS.  Notably, however, informed consent also meets other criteria for in-
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After Sosa, the question that must be answered by the courts is 
precisely whether norms governing human subjects protections, and 
specifically the norms governing informed consent, rise to the level of 
significance of those torts recognized under the ATS.  A greater un-
derstanding of ATS jurisprudence facilitates this analysis. 
1.  Historical Perspective on the ATS 
When the ATS was enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
the law of nations comprised two domains.  The first domain regarded 
norms governing interactions among nation-states,92 understood to lie 
within the power of the executive and legislative spheres.93  The sec-
ond domain, located within the judicial sphere, consisted in “a body 
of judge-made law regulating the conduct of individuals situated out-
side domestic boundaries and consequently carrying an international 
savor.”94  In the two hundred years since the enactment of the ATS, 
terpreting what constitutes international law.  One widely recognized standard for de-
fining customary international law requires a demonstration of state practice stemming 
from a perceived legal obligation.  See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 
38(1)(b) (June 26, 1945) (noting that customary international law follows required 
state practice that stems from legal obligation).  Substantial evidence exists to suggest 
that states perceive a legal obligation to require consent in any experimentation on 
human persons.  See infra Part III.A (chronicling this requirement in numerous legally 
binding instruments).  A second standard for judging the international law examines 
the degree to which the international community abhors a certain conduct.  Under 
this analysis, the international community considers abstention from the most abhor-
rent conduct as a peremptory norm.  See Donald Francis Donovan & Anthea Roberts, 
The Emerging Recognition of Universal Civil Jurisdiction, 100 AM. J. INT’L L.142, 145 (2006) 
(describing a trend toward recognizing peremptory norms in the international law as 
applicable to all states and individuals because of the heinous conduct they proscribe).  
Given the universal animus toward nonconsensual research following the exploitation 
of human subjects during World War II, see infra Part III.A.1, the element of informed 
consent would also be considered a peremptory norm in the international context, 
and as such, it would be actionable conduct in any forum concerned with creating ac-
countability for violations of international law. There is an extensive literature describ-
ing both reliance on state practice and the concept of peremptory norms in defining 
international law.  While it is important to note their existence, this Comment will not 
devote any further attention to either approach, because Sosa’s holding controls any 
decision in a U.S. court considering a potential ATS claim. 
92 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 714 (stating that this first element included “the science 
which teaches the rights subsisting between nations or states, and the obligations cor-
respondent to those rights”) quoting EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, 
Preliminaries § 3 (Joseph Chitty & Edward D. Ingraham eds. and trans., T. & J.W. 
Johnson & Co., 1883), available at http://www.constitution.org/vattel/vattel.htm)). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 715. 
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courts have worked to understand and refine the scope of judge-made 
law actionable under its provisions.95
Section 9 of the Judiciary Act created the ATS to remedy Con-
gress’s frustration with its inability to enforce or punish violations of 
international treaties or of the law of nations.96  At its instantiation, 
the ATS was intended to provide jurisdiction in United States courts 
for three specific types of offenses in violation of the law of nations:  
“violations of safe conducts, infringements of the rights of ambassa-
dors, and piracy.”97  The ATS sought to address these particular viola-
tions because they were commonly considered to require a “judicial 
remedy and at the same time threaten[ed] serious consequences in 
international affairs.”98  Still, even the Sosa Court admitted that, “de-
spite considerable scholarly attention, it is fair to say that a consensus 
understanding of what Congress intended has proven elusive.”99
The primary tension the Court considered in Sosa was whether the 
ATS provides only a jurisdictional basis for a suit in a United States 
federal court where a cause of action independently exists in interna-
tional law, or whether the statute also permits the courts to recognize 
a new cause of action for violations of international law.100  These di-
verging views have resulted, at least in part, from conflicting interpre-
tations of the statute in two landmark cases in ATS jurisprudence:   
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala101 and Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.102  The Fi-
95 See supra note 90 and accompanying text (recognizing that the scope of the ATS 
remains incompletely defined). 
96 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716 (determining that Congress wished to “‘cause infrac-
tions of treaties, or of the law of nations[,] to be punished’” (quoting JAMES MADISON, 
JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 60 (E. H. Scott ed., 1893))). 
97 Id. at 715 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES *68, which identified 
these three kinds of violations as the “principal offences against the law of nations”).  
This section discusses the Sosa Court’s interpretation of the limitation of jurisdiction to 
these torts.  It is important to note, however, that one possibility for the restriction of 
recognized torts to these circumstances is that these acts comprised the great majority 
of interactions in the international context at the time of the statute’s creation.  In ap-
plying the “definable, universal, and obligatory” standard, developed in Sosa to in-
formed consent, see infra Part III.B-C, the growing number of modern international 
transactions must be considered.  This context informs an understanding of those 
modern torts which reach the level of specificity and concern as those when the statute 
was enacted must include this as a consideration. 
98 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715. 
99 Id. at 718-19. 
100 See id. at 713 (“The parties and amici here advance radically different historical 
interpretations of this terse provision.”). 
101 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
102 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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lartiga court took the position that the ATS permits courts to consider 
new causes of action for violations of international law; the Tel-Oren 
court rejected that position.103  Review of the Sosa Court’s considera-
tion of both cases favors the Filartiga approach by recognizing viola-
tions of international norms as part of the federal common law.  The 
Court, however, advised caution in exercising judicial power to create 
new causes of action under the federal common law. 
2.  Filartiga and Tel-Oren 
In 1980, Filartiga, which involved violations of international norms 
prohibiting torture, broadly expanded the reach of the ATS.  As one 
scholar has summarized:104
The Second Circuit found that:  (1) the law of nations is part of the fed-
eral common law, such that cases arising under it arise under the laws of 
the United States as required by Article III of the Constitution; (2) the 
law of nations “‘may be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, 
writing professedly on public law; or by the general usage and practice of 
nations; or by judicial decisions recognizing and enforcing that law’”;
105
 
(3) a norm must “command ‘the general assent of civilized nations’”
106
 
to be part of the law of nations; (4) the law of nations must be inter-
preted “not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the 
nations of the world today.”
107
The Second Circuit’s findings and reasoning in Filartiga imply that 
the law of nations is dynamic, and the ATS enjoyed a period of expan-
sive interpretation following the holding in that case.108  While the 
Supreme Court later narrowed the application of the ATS in Sosa, it 
expressly stated that the ATS is not limited only to the narrow set of 
offenses initially granted jurisdiction by courts under the common law 
103 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the Filartiga and Tel-Oren decisions). 
104 Pauline Abadie, A New Story of David and Goliath:  The Alien Tort Claims Act Gives 
Victims of Environmental Injustice in the Developing World a Viable Claim Against Multina-
tional Corporations, 34 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 745, 758 (2004). 
105 Id. (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880 (quoting United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. 
(5 Wheat) 153, 160-61 (1820))). 
106 Id. (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 
677, 694 (1900))). 
107 Id. (quoting Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881 (original footnotes omitted)). 
108 Id. at 757 (“Before 1980, the [ATS’s] jurisprudence only consisted of two cases.  
The Second Circuit’s ruling in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala gave the [ATS] a new unexpected 
dimension.” (footnote omitted)). 
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at the time of its enactment.109  The Sosa Court recognized the dy-
namic nature of the law of nations, and the Court continues to accept 
that appropriate interpretation of the law of nations can evolve 
through the creation of federal common law.  However, the Court 
also clarified that the law of nations would include only binding inter-
national treaties or customary international law that matched the  
degree of international concern for the three actionable violations ini-
tially recognized under ATS jurisdiction.110  While ultimately respect-
ing the Filartiga position on the dynamic nature of the ATS, the Sosa 
Court also addressed challenges to the Filartiga approach voiced in 
Tel-Oren. 
In large part, the Sosa decision was influenced by the divided 
court that wrote a plurality opinion in Tel-Oren.111  The Tel-Oren court 
considered the applicability of the ATS to an attack on a civilian bus 
in Israel.  The bus was seized by members of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization, and the plaintiffs, mostly Israeli citizens who were or 
who represented victims of the attack, named as defendants the Lib-
yan Arab Republic and various Arab organizations.112  In deciding the 
merits of the case, the issue of jurisdictional versus substantive author-
ity of the ATS sharply fractured the court.  In a concurring opinion, 
Judge Edwards supported the view of the Filartiga court and found a 
cause of action under the ATS, which “required only a showing that 
the defendant’s actions violated the substantive law of nations.”113  
Judge Bork, also filing a concurrence, favored a more restrictive view 
of the ATS, writing that, “it is essential that [the allegedly violated law 
create] an explicit grant of a cause of action before a private plaintiff 
be allowed to enforce principles of international law in a federal tri-
bunal.”114  The disagreement between Edwards and Bork in the Tel-
Oren case renewed the debate following Filartiga and its progeny over 
109 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715, 724 (2004) (listing “violation of safe 
conducts, infringement on the rights of ambassadors, and piracy” as the three princi-
pal causes of action initially given practical effect by the ATS). 
110 See infra Part II.B.3 (discussing the Sosa standard). 
111 See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 731 (“[F]or practical purposes the point of today’s dis-
agreement has been focused since the exchange between Judge Edwards and Judge 
Bork in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic . . . .”). 
112 See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
113 Id. at 777 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
114 Id. at 801 (Bork, J., concurring).  Bork expressly rejected Edwards’s approach 
to ATS applicability, believing it to be “fundamentally wrong.”  Id. 
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the scope of the ATS.115  The Supreme Court settled this debate when 
it decided Sosa in 2004. 
3.  The Sosa Standard Defined:  A Jurisdictional Statute  
Recognizing Federal Common Law 
In attempting to navigate the divergent approaches to jurisdiction 
and merits in the Filartiga and Tel-Oren cases, the Sosa Court opted for 
middle ground.  When it established the standard for applicability of 
the ATS to potential new causes of action, the Sosa Court clearly stated 
that the statute was intended to be jurisdictional in nature.116  Some 
read this finding to support the position that the only actionable 
claims under the ATS are those which are self-executing, that is, those 
which allege a violation of an international norm that itself grants a 
private right of action.  The Sosa Court in fact held that the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) was not a suffi-
cient source for implicating the ATS as a remedy because the ICCPR 
was not intended to be self-executing.117  Closely read, however, Sosa 
states that the ICCPR itself cannot be the sole source of international 
law relied upon to support an ATS action.118  Nonetheless, the Court 
also held that Congress passed the ATS with the intent that it would 
have an immediate practical effect, conferring a cause of action on 
the merits for the three violations that were considered to be part of 
the federal common law at the time.119  To give effect to both conclu-
sions, the Court provided that, under certain circumstances, the judi-
ciary has the authority to develop the federal common law beyond 
those violations actionable at the enactment of the ATS.120  In exercis-
ing this authority, the judiciary should be guided by the same consid-
115 See Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 115-18 (describing the cases and controversy 
following Filartiga). 
116 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713-14 (citing, among other reasons, the placement of the 
ATS in section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which was concerned with federal juris-
diction, as proof of congressional intent that the statute be considered in terms of its 
jurisdictional authority). 
117 Id. at 728. 
118 Id. at 728-31. 
119 Id. at 719-20 (arguing that two proposed interpretations of the ATS supported 
application to a limited set of offenses that were at the time considered violations of 
the law of nations). 
120 Id. at 724 (“The jurisdictional grant is best read as having been enacted on the 
understanding that the common law would provide a cause of action for the modest 
number of international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the 
time.”). 
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erations that motivated the recognition of the initial violations under 
the ATS.121  Further describing this standard, the Court explained: 
Whatever the ultimate criteria for accepting a cause of action subject to 
jurisdiction under [the ATS], we are persuaded that federal courts 
should not recognize private claims under federal common law for viola-
tions of any international law norm with less definite content and accep-
tance among civilized nations than the historical paradigms familiar 
when [the ATS] was enacted . . . . This limit upon judicial recognition is 
generally consistent with the reasoning of many of the courts and judges 
who faced the issue before it reached this Court.
122
Among the prior courts that had considered this issue, the Sosa Court 
expressly noted the Filartiga approach.123  While the Sosa Court added 
restrictions to Filartiga’s holding, the Court nevertheless accepted it. 
III.  INFORMED CONSENT MEETS THE SOSA STANDARD FOR A NORM OF 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 
When Filartiga resurrected the ATS in 1980, it became the first 
modern case in ATS jurisprudence to express the United States’s views 
on the statute’s applicability and reach.  Filartiga established that the 
ATS would apply to certain violations of human rights.  To determine 
which human rights were qualified to become part of the federal 
common law, the court relied on its understanding of customary in-
ternational law: 
[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act 
or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civi-
lized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists and com-
mentators, who by years of labor, research and experience, have made 
themselves peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they 
treat.  Such works are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the specu-
lations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for 
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.
124
Essentially, the Court has looked to scholars and jurists to develop 
a standard for customary law that includes those violations of norms 
that are “definable, universal and obligatory.”125  The facts in Sosa126 
121 Id. 
122 Id. at 732. 
123 Id. 
124 Id. at 734 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700 (quotation marks 
omitted)). 
125 Id. at 732 (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. 
Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)); see also Abadie, supra note 104, at 763-68 (de-
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did not meet this standard, because “a single illegal detention of less 
than a day, followed by the transfer of custody to lawful authorities 
and a prompt arraignment, violates no norm of customary interna-
tional law so well defined as to support the creation of a federal rem-
edy.”127  Additionally, the Court stated that creating a private cause of 
action in this specific case—-a short-term arbitrary arrest and deten-
tion—would go beyond any common law recognition of such a 
norm.128  In drawing this conclusion, the Court implied that a more 
defined norm,129 and one that was widely actionable in common law, 
would provide stronger support for creating a private right of action 
under the federal common law.130  Importantly, the Court noted that 
the “definable, universal and obligatory standard” does not demand 
that the international norm actually be declared universally; instead, 
the standard means that the violation of the norm must be universally 
condemned and that the norm must be specific.  Applying that inter-
pretation in the context of human subjects protections, it follows that 
the wide condemnation of research without voluntary consent, com-
scribing four standards by which courts could interpret customary international law, 
and noting that the most common is the “definable, universal and obligatory stan-
dard”).  Abadie criticizes the judiciary’s narrow approach to customary international 
law, advocating a broader reading based on the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations 
Law, in which a norm need not be universal to be considered customary international 
law.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(1)-(3) (1987) (al-
lowing “widely accepted” rules or agreements to satisfy the requirements for customary 
international law). 
126 United States authorities suspected that the defendant in Sosa, Humberto Alva-
rez-Machain (Alvarez), was involved in the torture of a Drug Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) officer in connection with the officer’s assignment in Mexico.  Sosa, 542 
U.S. at 697.  The DEA requested the Mexican government’s assistance in bringing Al-
varez to the United States.  Id. at 698.  When the Mexican government could not assist, 
the DEA “approved a plan to hire Mexican nationals [including petitioner Sosa] to 
seize Alvarez and bring him to the [U.S.] for trial.”  Id.  While carrying out this plan, 
the petitioners “abducted” Alvarez from his home and held him in a motel for one 
night prior to flying him to the United States, at which point he was “arrested by fed-
eral officers.”  Id. 
127 Id. at 738. 
128 Id. (stating that creating a private cause of action for this violation would ex-
ceed the Court’s discretion). 
129 Alvarez-Machain cited only two sources of international law, neither of which 
indicated that an arrest of the length he endured would be considered a violation of 
binding international law.  See id. at 734 (discussing Alvarez-Machain’s claims under 
the UDHR and ICCPR). 
130 Id. at 712 (“Although we agree the statute is in terms only jurisdictional, we 
think at the time of enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal courts to hear claims in 
a very limited category defined by the law of nations and recognized at common law.”). 
TALATI PENNUMBRA.DOC 11/21/2006  7:01:59 PM 
2006] AN OPEN DOOR TO ENDING EXPLOITATION 257 
 
bined with the consistency in the definition of what informed consent 
specifically requires, does meet the standard described in Sosa. 
A.  Human Subjects Protections Require Informed Consent 
Several bodies—including the Nuremberg International Military 
Tribunal, the World Medical Association, the United Nations, the 
Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences, and the 
International Conference on Harmonisation—have promulgated in-
ternational guidelines governing research using human subjects.  To-
gether, these entities establish varied degrees of protection for human 
subjects, and even more varied degrees of enforcement.131  Moreover, 
the multiple policies carry different legal weight in the international 
context.132  Consistent among them, however, is the imperative that 
informed consent be secured from each subject prior to participating 
in medical experimentation. 
To understand how informed consent meets the Sosa standard, an 
examination of the international instruments governing informed 
consent is necessary. 
1.  Nuremberg Code 
Following World War II, the Nuremberg Trials resulted in a 
statement of the first international standards attributable to human 
subjects research.133  The statement, which came to be called the 
“Nuremberg Code,” comprises the principles set forth by the post-war 
military tribunals in United States v. Brandt.134  The Code reflects the 
131 While the provisions of these instruments differ significantly, areas of overlap 
should create a strong persuasive force for defining customary international law. 
132 When considering application of the ATS to clinical research abroad, the legal 
force of the various policies becomes salient.  See supra notes 96-99 and accompanying 
text (discussing the “law of nations” designation as a requirement for a valid ATS 
claim). 
133 See Meier, supra note 40, at 523 (“[T]he Nuremberg Code became the first in-
ternational standard defining permissible medical experiments.”). 
134 See 2 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NUERNBERG TRIBUNALS UNDER 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10, at 189, 237 (U.S. Gov’t Printing Office, 1946-1949) 
[hereinafter NUREMBERG CODE].  The Nuremberg Tribunals examined numerous al-
legations of war crimes.  The Doctors’ Trial or Medical Case, two names by which the 
Brandt trial was also known, involved all of the doctors allegedly responsible for con-
ducting cruel medical experiments on unsuspecting subjects during World War II.  See 
infra note 135 (describing these medical experiments).  The principles now called the 
Nuremberg Code were included in the decision of the Brandt court, see NUREMBERG 
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thoughts of the tribunal judges in Brandt after they examined the 
atrocities committed in the name of medical experimentation during 
the War.135  The purpose of the Nuremberg Code was to obligate in-
vestigators never to repeat these behaviors.  The Nuremberg Code be-
came an official part of the record of the Nuremberg International 
Military Tribunal, composed of a body of representatives from the 
United States, the French Republic, Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land, and the Soviet Union.136
The Nuremberg Code established ten principles for medical ex-
perimentation using human subjects.137  The most fundamental aspect 
of the Code is its provision on informed consent: 
The voluntary consent of the human subject is absolutely essential. 
 This means that the person involved should have legal capacity to 
give consent; should be so situated as to be able to exercise free power of 
choice, without the intervention of any element of force, fraud, deceit, 
duress, over-reaching, or other ulterior form of constraint or coercion; 
and should have sufficient knowledge and comprehension of the ele-
ments of the subject matter involved as to enable him to make an under-
standing and enlightened decision.
138
CODE, supra. at 181-82, and are reprinted at http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/ 
nuremberg.html. 
135 Involuntary medical experimentation was prevalent during World War II: 
[E]xperiments included freezing experiments (subjects were forced to remain 
in a tank of ice water for periods up to 3 hours), malaria experiments (sub-
jects were deliberately infected with malaria to investigate immunization pro-
cedures), sulfanilamide experiments (subjects were deliberately wounded and 
then infected with bacteria such as streptococcus, gas gangrene, and tetanus), 
typhus experiments (subjects were deliberately infected with spotted fever vi-
rus merely to keep the virus alive), and poison experiments (subjects were de-
liberately shot with poisoned bullets and then killed immediately to permit 
autopsies).  The subjects . . . neither benefited from such treatments nor gave 
voluntary consent to them. 
Meier, supra note 40, at 521-22 (footnote omitted). 
136 See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the 
European Axis and Charter of the International Military Tribunal Preamble, Aug. 8, 1945, 
82 U.N.T.S. 280, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/FULL/350?OpenDocument  
(listing the parties to the agreement). 
137 NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 134, at 181-82. 
138 Id. at 181 (emphasis added).  The Code further states that, “[d]uring the 
course of the experiment the human subject should be at liberty to bring the experi-
ment to an end if he has reached the physical or mental state where continuation of 
the experiment seems to him to be impossible.”  Id. at 182.  Permitting a subject to 
terminate her participation at will reinforces the belief that research should be con-
ducted only on voluntary and willing subjects.  The Nuremberg Code also contains 
provisions relating to the utility of the experiment, and requirements for preexisting 
animal studies, avoidance of physical and mental suffering, adequacy of facilities and 
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The Nuremberg Code thus describes a customary understanding of 
the need for consent when conducting research in a global setting 
and provides the definitive elements of valid consent.139
2.  Declaration of Helsinki 
The World Medical Association, a global organizing body for phy-
sicians, adopted the Declaration of Helsinki in 1964 to generate a self-
regulating mechanism to protect human subjects internationally.140  
Like the Nuremberg Code, the Declaration of Helsinki contains provi-
sions requiring the consent of subjects prior to their participation in 
research: 
In any research on human beings, each potential subject must be ade-
quately informed of . . . the anticipated benefits and potential risks of 
the [research] . . . . The subject should be informed of the right to ab-
stain from participation in the study or to withdraw consent to partici-
pate at any time without reprisal. . . . [T]he physician should then obtain 
the subject’s freely-given informed consent, preferably in writing. 
 . . . [T]he physician should be particularly cautious if the subject is in 
a dependent relationship with the physician or may consent under du-
ress.
141
qualified staff, and procedures for termination if a study is found to create excessive 
risks to participants.  Id.  The Code additionally calls for abstention when there is a be-
lief that death or severe disability is possible, or when risk to the individual is dispro-
portionate to the expected benefit to the larger community.  Id. 
139 But see Meier, supra note 40, at 523 (conceding that the Nuremberg Code is 
“not a binding international treaty”). 
140 WORLD MED. ASS’N, WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION DECLARATION OF HELSINKI:  
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS (2004), available at 
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/pdf/17c.pdf [hereinafter HELSINKI VI].  Following its 
development in 1964, the Declaration has been amended five times.  For example, in 
1975, the document included provisions for ethics committee review of research; in 
1996, the WMA added provisions regarding the use of placebos.  See Delon Human & 
Sev S. Fluss, The World Medical Association’s Declaration of Helsinki:  Historical and 
Contemporary Perspectives 6 (July 25, 2001) (unpublished paper, draft on file with the 
World Medical Association), available at http://www.wma.net/e/ethicsunit/pdf/ 
draft_historical_contemporary_perspectives.pdf.  The 2000 amendments made signifi-
cant changes, including controversial changes regarding research done in the course 
of medical care.  Id.  at 17.  Despite the controversy, scholars agreed that the 2000 revi-
sions were designed to maintain this document as “the cornerstone of biomedical re-
search [as it has been] for the last 30 years and the largely unquestioned anchor for 
ethical decision-making in clinical trials.”  Id. at 2 (quotation marks and brackets omit-
ted).  Although the WMA added a clarification to paragraph 30 in 2004, the 2000 ver-
sion contains the last substantial revision of the document. 
141 HELSINKI VI, supra note 140, §§ 22-23. 
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The Declaration of Helsinki is widely accepted as the most influ-
ential guidance document in the creation of statutory protections for 
human subjects.142  “The Declaration of Helsinki . . . is the fundamen-
tal document in the field of ethics in biomedical research and has  
influenced the formulation of international, regional and national 
legislation and codes of conduct.”143  Fifteen countries—Australia, 
Belgium, Brazil, China, Germany, India, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, 
Norway, South Africa, Switzerland, Uganda, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States—adhere to the principles set forth in the Declara-
tion of Helsinki regarding the conduct of acceptable clinical trials in-
volving human subjects.144  While some countries require even 
142 See COUNCIL FOR INT’L ORGS. OF MED. SCIS. (CIOMS), INTERNATIONAL ETHI-
CAL GUIDELINES FOR BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS, “Interna-
tional Instruments and Guidelines” (2002), available at http://www.cioms.ch/ 
guidelines_nov_2002_blurb.htm [hereinafter CIOMS GUIDELINES] (providing guide-
lines for the implementation of the Declaration of Helsinki); INT’L CONFERENCE ON 
HARMONISATION:  GOOD CLINICAL PRACTICE:  CONSOLIDATED GUIDELINE § 2.1, re-
printed in 62 Fed. Reg. 25,691, 25,695 (May 9, 1997) [hereinafter ICH GUIDELINES] 
(“Clinical trials should be conducted in accordance with the ethical principles that 
have their origin in the Declaration of Helsinki . . . .”).  But see Meier, supra note 40, at 
526 (criticizing the Declaration of Helsinki as less protective than the Nuremberg 
Code).  Meier comments on the distinction between therapeutic versus nontherapeu-
tic research, which was created in the original 1965 formulation of the Declaration of 
Helsinki and preserved in the modern version.  This distinction established separate 
considerations when research was performed for partially therapeutic rather than 
solely investigative purposes.  See HELSINKI VI, supra note 140, §§ 28-32 (enumerating 
additional considerations when medical research is combined with medical care); cf. 
WORLD MED. ASS’N, WORLD MEDICAL ASSOCIATION DECLARATION OF HELSINKI:  ETHI-
CAL PRINCIPLES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS, pts. II-III (1996), available 
at http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/helsinki/ (providing the original formulation 
of the Declaration of Helsinki).  When examined carefully, the earlier version shows a 
more explicit description of a distinction between “clinical” (or therapeutic) research 
and “non-clinical biomedical” (or nontherapeutic) research.  Additionally, it provided 
that a physician could suspend the requirement of consent when research was thera-
peutic, if the physician declared her reasons for doing so.  See id. § II.5.  In the 2000 
version of the Declaration of Helsinki, this provision no longer appears; it remains ab-
sent from the current (2004) version.  The change may represent recognition of the 
possibility for exploitation under the therapeutic misconception.  See supra note 65 and 
accompanying text (defining the therapeutic misconception and discussing its relation 
to the exploitation of human research subjects). 
143 CIOMS GUIDELINES, supra note 142. 
144 See Human & Fluss, supra note 140, at 8-11 (citing statements or laws from all 
fifteen of these countries, each adhering to principles put forth in the Declaration of 
Helsinki regarding the conduct of acceptable clinical trials within their borders); see 
also NAT’L HEALTH & MED. RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL STATEMENT ON ETHICAL 
CONDUCT IN RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMANS 2 (1999) (citing the trend for nations to 
publish research ethics codes that observe the standards of the Declaration of Helsinki, 
and noting that Australia “has followed these trends” in documents such as the Austra-
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stronger protections than Helsinki mandates, this fact does not un-
dermine the characterization of Helsinki as a universal minimum stan-
dard for ethics in research.145
lian Statement on Human Experimentation); Marie-Luce Delfosse, Research Committees and 
the Principle of Justice:  Putting Ethics and Law to the Test, in RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUB-
JECTS:  ETHICS, LAW, AND SOCIAL POLICY 286, 286-300 (David N. Weisstub ed., 1998) 
(discussing Belgian legislation); NAT’L DRUG REGULATION ADMIN., DRUG CLINICAL 
TRIAL ADMINISTRATION NORMS (Sept. 1, 1999) (referencing, in English translation, 
Brazilian norms); Human & Fluss, supra note 140, at 8 & nn.43-44 (citing official Chi-
nese regulations requiring compliance with Helsinki principles for all research involv-
ing human subjects); INDIAN COUNCIL OF MED. RESEARCH, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR 
BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH ON HUMAN SUBJECTS 7 (2000) (referencing Indian national 
legislation drawn from international codes, including the Declaration of Helsinki); 
HEALTH RESEARCH COUNCIL OF N.Z., GUIDELINES ON ETHICS IN HEALTH RESEARCH 
(2002) (describing New Zealand’s guidelines); NORWEGIAN MINISTRY OF EDUC. & RE-
SEARCH, TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR THE REGIONAL COMMITTEES FOR MEDICAL RE-
SEARCH ETHICS (last amended July 1, 2003) (on file with the author) (prescribing con-
formity to the Declaration of Helsinki); SWISS FED. COUNCIL, ORDINANCE ON CLINICAL 
TRIALS OF THERAPEUTIC PRODUCTS, GOOD PRACTICES FOR CLINICAL TRIALS § 1, art. 4 
(Dec. 15, 2000) (incorporating the Declaration of Helsinki’s principles through the 
ICH Guidelines); SOUTH AFRICAN MED. COUNCIL, GUIDELINES ON ETHICS FOR MEDI-
CAL RESEARCH §§ 1, 4.7 (1993) (indicating agreement with the principles in the Decla-
ration of Helsinki); ROYAL COLL. OF PHYSICIANS OF LONDON, GUIDELINES ON THE 
PRACTICE OF ETHICS COMMITTEES IN MEDICAL RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN SUBJECTS 
3 (3d ed. 1996) (adding the United Kingdom’s incorporation of Helsinki principles). 
145 The example of Switzerland demonstrates this point.  In the early 1990s, Swiss 
regulations referred to the Declaration of Helsinki as “the ethical basis of clinical tri-
als,” and required that the Declaration “be fully known to, and complied with by, any 
person involved in a research activity on man.”  Human & Fluss, supra note 140, at 9-10 
(describing an informal translation of the 1993 Swiss Regulations on medicines at the 
clinical trial stage).  Though the current Swiss guidelines require compliance with ICH 
Guidelines, see supra note 144, the Swiss government’s shift to more direct reliance on 
ICH principles does not undermine the value or authority of the Declaration of Hel-
sinki with regard to informed consent.  Instead, the shift can be seen as a trend toward 
providing even greater protection for human subjects by recognizing what are consid-
ered stronger ethical guidelines governing research.  See supra note 39 (discussing the 
view that the ICH guidelines are thought to provide stronger protection than the Dec-
laration of Helsinki).  Some commentators, such as Lurie and Greco, have criticized 
this trend, characterizing it as a deviation from the Declaration’s fundamental princi-
ples governing research.  See supra note 55.  Instead, new guidelines may attempt “to 
indicate how the fundamental ethical principles . . . as set forth in the Declaration of 
Helsinki, could be applied effectively, particularly in developing countries, taking into 
account culture, socioeconomic circumstances, national laws, and executive and ad-
ministrative arrangements.” Human & Fluss, supra note 140, at 7 (noting this objective 
in the CIOMS guidelines (citation and quotation marks omitted)); see also infra notes 
146-51 and accompanying text (discussing the CIOMS guidelines).  Importantly, across 
these documents, the definition and elements of informed consent remain consistent.  
The pervasive belief that the principles in the Declaration of Helsinki must be followed 
wherever research occurs mandates support for the Declaration’s notion of consent, 
which is reiterated throughout the subsequent documents that are meant to expand 
upon it.  While the individual documents may differ in other regards, the principle of 
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3.  CIOMS International Ethical Guidelines for  
Research Involving Human Subjects 
The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences 
(CIOMS) is an international nongovernmental organization, estab-
lished in 1949, which operates under specific relations with the 
United Nations (UN) and two UN agencies, the World Health Or-
ganization (WHO)146 and the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).147  In the 1970s, the CIOMS 
began its work on ethics in biomedical research, with the purpose of 
creating guidelines “to indicate how the ethical principles that should 
guide the conduct of biomedical research involving human subjects, 
as set forth in the Declaration of Helsinki, could be effectively applied, 
particularly in developing countries, given their socioeconomic cir-
cumstances, laws and regulations, and executive and administrative 
arrangements.”148
The report creates three ethical principles for conducting bio-
medical research—respect for persons, beneficence, and justice—and 
formulates guidelines to realize these goals.149  Embedded within the 
principle of “respect for persons” is respect for the notion of auton-
omy and each individual’s right to and capacity for self-
determination.150  An individual must be given an opportunity to de-
liberate over personal choices in order to respect her right to self-
determination; the researcher achieves this by following the guide-
lines applicable to informed consent.151  Thus, informed consent is 
crucial to the CIOMS principles guiding biomedical research. 
consent itself meets the standard necessary for recognition of a customary norm of in-
ternational law. See infra Part III.B. (explaining how informed consent meets the stan-
dard for a norm of customary international law). 
146 The World Health Organization also promulgates guidelines for good clinical 
practices for clinical trials.  See CIOMS GUIDELINES, supra note 142, at “International 
Instruments and Guidelines” (discussing the WHO’s issuance of clinical guidelines in 
1995). 
147 Id. at “Background.” 
148 Id. 
149 See id. at “General Ethical Principles” (listing and explaining these three basic 
principles). 
150 Id. 
151 See id. at “Guidelines 4-6” (discussing the need for individual informed consent, 
the elements of a valid informed consent disclosure, and the obligations of sponsors 
and investigators in obtaining informed consent). 
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4.  International Conference on Harmonisation: 
Good Clinical Practices 
The International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH) repre-
sents an international initiative to bring together regulators and in-
dustry representatives to decide the procedures necessary to “ensure 
and assess the safety, quality and efficacy of medicines.”152  The ICH-
established guidelines for good clinical practices in the conduct of 
clinical research involving human subjects include specific guidelines 
relating to informed consent: 
[Informed consent is a] process by which a subject voluntarily confirms 
his or her willingness to participate in a particular trial, after having 
been informed of all aspects of the trial that are relevant to the subject’s 
decision to participate.  Informed consent is documented by means of a 
written, signed, and dated informed consent form.
153
To ensure valid informed consent, investigators must comply with the 
detailed regulatory guidelines set forth by the ICH.154
5.  United Nations Provisions 
Two major human rights instruments created by the United Na-
tions are also relevant to the conduct of clinical trials in developing 
countries:  the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) and 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).  
The UDHR establishes that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”155  Argua-
bly, in the historical context of the signing of the UDHR, just follow-
ing World War II and the express condemnation of nonvoluntary hu-
man experimentation in the Nuremberg Trials, the UDHR alone 
stands to support a requirement for informed consent in human sub-
jects research.  Nonetheless, the document has been criticized for its 
152 See International Conference on Harmonisation (ICH), Structure of ICH, 
http://www.ich.org (follow “Structure of ICH” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).  
Members of the ICH include regulatory and industry representatives from the United 
States, the European Union, and Japan.  Id.  The guidelines resulting from this initia-
tive therefore represent a consensus among industry and regulatory perspectives re-
garding the protections that should universally apply to human subjects. 
153 ICH GUIDELINES, supra note 142, § 1.28 (Informed Consent), reprinted in 62 
Fed. Reg. at 25,694. 
154 Id. § 4.8 (Informed Consent of Trial Subjects), reprinted in 62 Fed. Reg. at 
25,697. 
155 Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 5, G.A. Res. 217A, at 73, U.N. 
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
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lack of specificity.156  The UN also has developed numerous interna-
tional human rights covenants, which carry the legally binding status 
of treaties.  One in particular, the ICCPR,157 adds specificity to the ob-
ligations under the UDHR.  Article 7 of the ICCPR states that “[n]o 
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment.  In particular, no one shall be subjected 
without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.”158  
The language of this statement implies that medical or scientific ex-
perimentation without free consent is tantamount to “inhuman or de-
grading treatment.”  In fact, some people opposed the addition of the 
second sentence primarily because they felt the first sentence obvi-
ously included medical experimentation; it was eventually included 
because of the perceived weight of the importance of informed con-
sent in the aftermath of the Nuremberg Trials.159  While preserving 
the sentiment of the UDHR, the ICCPR gives force to these guide-
lines, and United States courts have recognized that the ICCPR has 
binding status as international law.160
6.  Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
(CHRB) is “the first legally binding international treaty to [specifi-
156 See Meier, supra note 40, at 534 (noting that the Declaration “lacks the specific-
ity to provide a link to human experimentation”). 
157 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (XXI), Annex, G.A. Res. 
2200, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
158 Id. art. 7. 
159 See Annotations on the Text of the Draft International Covenants on Human 
Rights, U.N. GAOR, 10th Sess., Annex, agenda item 28 (Part II) at 31, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. 
A/2929 (July 1, 1955) (explaining that the second clause was included to reiterate the 
importance of informed and free consent in the wake of World War II atrocities).  For 
a more detailed consideration of this view, see David P. Fidler, “Geographical Morality” 
Revisited:  International Relations, International Law, and the Controversy Over Placebo-
Controlled HIV Clinical Trials in Developing Countries, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 299, 328-37, 342-
44 (2001) (asserting that Article 7 implicates both the provisions against inhuman or 
degrading treatment and the right to life).  But see Part II.B.3 (discussing the Sosa 
Court’s view that the ICCPR alone could not form the basis of an ATS claim). 
160 See Trovan Case, No. 01 CIV 8118, 2005 WL 1870811, at *9, *13 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 
9, 2005) (stating that activities in violation of the law of nations also violate U.S. laws).  
Nonetheless, this finding was not sufficient for the court to recognize a private right of 
action or to award relief under the ATS on the basis of the violation.  See id. at *13; see 
also infra Part III.B (discussing elements required for application of the ATS to clinical 
trials conducted without informed consent). 
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cally] govern human experimentation.”161  Article 5 of this agreement 
delineates the primary requirements for informed consent: 
An intervention in the health field may only be carried out after the per-
son concerned has given free and informed consent to it. 
 This person shall beforehand be given appropriate information as to 
the purpose and nature of the intervention as well as on its conse-
quences and risks. 
 The person concerned may freely withdraw consent at any time.
162
When the intervention contemplated is carried out in the context of 
scientific research, the agreement further provides in article 16 that 
“[r]esearch on a person may only be undertaken if . . . the persons 
undergoing research have been informed of their rights and the safe-
guards prescribed by law for their protection,” and “the necessary 
consent as provided for under article 5 has been given expressly, spe-
cifically and is documented.  Such consent may be freely withdrawn at 
any time.”163  Adopted by the majority of European Union (EU) mem-
ber states164 and currently applicable in nineteen of those,165 the 
CHRB confirms that informed consent is considered mandatory in all 
cases in which investigators conduct research on human subjects.  Like 
the ICCPR, the CHRB is binding on the states to which it applies.166
B.  Informed Consent Is Universal, Definable, and Obligatory 
In assessing whether informed consent meets the rigorous stan-
dard established by Sosa, courts must decide whether the combined 
scope of ethical guidelines governing informed consent defines this 
principle as a customary norm of international law.  Sosa states that 
161 Meier, supra note 40, at 528.  The ICCPR is also a legally binding document.  
See supra note 160 and accompanying text.  The ICCPR’s primary purpose, however, is 
to provide a more general discussion of political rights, whereas the CHRB is the first 
international text to focus on human rights in the medical context. 
162 Council of Europe, Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine ch. II, art. 
5, 36 I.L.M. 817, 821 (1997) [hereinafter CHRB]. 
163 Id. at 822; see also Meier, supra note 40, at 528 (citing CHRB articles 5 and 16 to 
describe that document’s rule for informed consent). 
164 Council of Europe Treaties, Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine 
http://www.coe.int/t/e/legal_affairs/legal_cooperation/bioethics/texts_and_documents/
1Treaties_COE.asp (follow “Chart of Signatories and Ratifications” hyperlink) (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2006) (listing thirty-four of the forty-five EU member states as signato-
ries). 
165 Id. (confirming ratification and entry into force in nineteen member states). 
166 See Meier, supra note 40, at 528 (discussing the binding nature of the CHRB 
and its content regarding free and informed consent). 
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such norms must be “definable, universal and obligatory.”167  In-
formed consent meets each criterion. 
1.  The Mandate for Informed Consent is Universal 
The principle that human subjects research mandates informed 
consent is universal.  Ruth Macklin168 writes: 
An undisputed criterion for determining that research is, in fact, exploita-
tive is failure to provide the information necessary for properly obtained 
consent:  telling potential subjects that they are being invited to partici-
pate in research, lack of an adequate explanation of the risks, potential 
benefits, procedures to be performed and alternative treatments, and 
failure to ensure that the potential subjects understand what they have 
been told and agree voluntarily to participate.
169
International instruments concerning human subjects research 
confirm Macklin’s conclusion.  The ICCPR, for example, represents 
international condemnation of the practice of medical experimenta-
tion without participants’ informed consent.170  In addition to the 
ICCPR, FDA regulations also apply the requirement of informed con-
sent to U.S. investigators’ conduct of research domestically171 and in 
167 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan 
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J., concurring)); see also 
supra note 125 and accompanying text (elaborating on Sosa’s interpretation of this 
standard). 
168 As the author of a scholarly treatise on the subject of ethical standards for re-
search in developing countries, Macklin qualifies as the precise kind of authority “who 
by years of labor, research, and experience [has] made [herself] peculiarly well ac-
quainted with the subject which [she] treats.”  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 734.  In its decision, the 
Sosa Court explicitly stated that, in the absence of a “controlling executive or legislative 
act or judicial decision,” courts rely on the “works of [experienced] jurists and com-
mentators . . . not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought 
to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.”  Id.; see also supra note 124 
and accompanying text. 
169 MACKLIN, supra note 19, at 100 (emphasis added).  The author goes on to write 
that, “[t]o the extent that these elements were lacking in the Nigerian [Trovan] study, 
it counts as a case of exploitation.”  Id.  Macklin’s conclusion lends support to the fact 
that the New York court’s finding with respect to the merits of the plaintiffs’ ATS claim 
was incorrect.  See supra Part II.A (discussing the Trovan Case). 
170 See supra notes 157-60 and accompanying text (describing the ICCPR and its 
binding effects); see also Sosa, 542 U.S. at 735 (finding that, although the ICCPR “was 
not self-executing,” it “does bind the United States as a matter of international law”). 
171 See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text (noting the findings of the Nur-
emberg Trials and their applicability to the United States). 
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foreign countries.172 Furthermore, the requirement appears in the 
binding international law document resulting from the CHRB,173 is 
recognized by at least fifteen states in the specific form outlined in the 
Declaration of Helsinki,174 and is recognized by private actors in both 
the CIOMS175 and the ICH guidelines.176  Taken together, these in-
struments demonstrate a universal condemnation of informed con-
sent violations. 
Although some consider informed consent to be a component of 
customary international law,177 one opposing view claims that the lack 
of “widespread [or] consistent state practice” refutes the existence of 
such a right.178  If successful, this criticism would challenge a finding 
of informed consent as customary international law, which is action-
able under the ATS.179  In response to this criticism, it is sufficient to 
note the distinction between two concepts:  a state’s demonstration of 
its respect for an existing norm, and the existence of the norm itself.  
In other words, individual states’ violations of a norm should not ne-
gate per se the existence of the norm.  The fact that individual nation-
states may refuse to abide by customary norms requiring informed 
consent cannot be used to refute the clear mandate for informed con-
sent established in the international instruments governing medical 
experimentation.180
172 See supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text (discussing FDA requirements for 
research that will later support an application to market a drug in the United States). 
173 See supra notes 161-63 and accompanying text (outlining the requirements 
placed on the EU member states that have ratified the CHRB). 
174 See supra note 144 (demonstrating the widespread acceptance and codification 
of the Declaration of Helsinki).  The majority of these additional states are not EU 
member states. 
175 See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text (laying out the CIOMS agree-
ment). 
176 See supra notes 152-54 and accompanying text (presenting the ICH guidelines). 
177 See Meier, supra note 40, at 535 (citing authorities arguing that the requirement 
of free and informed consent binds all nations, even without a multilateral treaty). 
178 Id.  But see supra note 91 (arguing that informed consent meets the state prac-
tice standard).  
179 See supra note 125 and accompanying text (noting the “definable, universal and 
obligatory” standard). 
180 See Fidler, supra note 159, at 337 (distinguishing the “right to free consent” 
from its implementation). 
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2.  Informed Consent is Definable 
While instruments vary in their specific descriptions of informed 
consent, most generally, the doctrine protects an individual’s rights to 
bodily integrity and to make choices about what can and cannot be 
done to her person.181  Adequate consent requires that investigators 
inform study participants about the risks and benefits attendant to a 
proposed intervention in a clinical trial and that their choice to par-
ticipate (and, in many cases, to withdraw) remains voluntary and mu-
table.182  This definition is consistent across instruments describing a 
principle of consent.183  The principle of informed consent is there-
fore so broadly accepted and specifically understood to require these 
minimum elements that the concept of informed consent can be con-
sidered to have a universal understanding in the international con-
text.184
3.  The Norm of Informed Consent is Obligatory 
One criterion by which to judge the “obligatory” requirement for 
a customary norm of international law is the existence of binding law 
supporting the norm.  International instruments create a binding re-
quirement to obey informed consent.  The ICCPR sets forth a re-
quirement for informed consent in a treaty that is binding upon the 
United States.185  The CHRB creates an analogous obligation on 
members of the EU.186  A second element by which the Sosa Court 
judged the obligatory nature of a potential tort duty was the existence 
of common law recognition of a right of action for the violation.187  
There is extensive U.S. common law recognition of a right of action 
181 Kevin M. King, Note, A Proposal for the Effective International Regulation of Biomedi-
cal Research Involving Human Subjects, 34 STAN. J. INT’L L. 163, 174 (1998) (arguing that 
informed consent upholds the “right to bodily integrity” and permits one “to exercise 
sovereignty over her body”). 
182 Id. at 190-97. 
183 See supra notes 138, 141, 153 & 162 (quoting these or similar elements in the 
Nuremberg Code, Declaration of Helsinki, ICH guidelines, and CHRB); see also supra 
note 148 and accompanying text (showing the acknowledgment of the Declaration of 
Helsinki’s definition in the CIOMS). 
184 See supra Part III.A (detailing guidelines in international instruments providing 
for informed consent in research); see also supra note 169 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the universal understanding of this norm and its minimum elements). 
185 See supra notes 157-60 (referencing the content and scope of the ICCPR). 
186 See supra notes 161-66 (discussing the CHRB). 
187 See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text (explaining the common law rec-
ognition requirement). 
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for failure to obtain informed consent,188 which further supports a 
finding that such a violation merits a private right of action under the 
federal common law.  Similarly, the dismissal of claims based on fo-
rum non conveniens suggests a belief that another forum will recog-
nize a cause of action and permit litigation of the claim.189
C.  A Norm of Informed Consent Should Be Recognized  
Under the Federal Common Law 
The Sosa decision continues to generate much controversy over its 
potential narrowing of the ATS’s applicability.190  In that decision, 
however, the Supreme Court was careful not to overrule a recent his-
tory of expansive interpretation under the ATS.  In fact, the Court ac-
knowledged and relied on Filartiga, a case that is considered to be the 
188 There is a rich literature discussing the absolute requirement for informed 
consent in the United States.  See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 92 
(N.Y. 1914) (maintaining a requirement for informed consent in any intervention 
taken on a person), overruled on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 9 (N.Y. 
1957).  With respect to clinical trials conducted abroad, U.S. common law supports the 
norms indicated in the Nuremberg Code.  See generally NUREMBERG CODE, supra note 
134, and accompanying text (describing the case of United States v. Brandt); United 
States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669, 708 (1987) (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that the 
majority’s reliance on “a judicially crafted rule [of governmental immunity] should 
[not] insulate from liability the involuntary and unknowing human experimentation 
alleged”); id. at 687 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that the legal question of im-
munity considered by the majority ought not abdicate the moral and legal imperative 
against unknowing human subjects).  The dissenters argued that the majority’s deci-
sion, resting on judicially created immunity, inappropriately ignored the absolute re-
quirements of the Nuremberg Code.  FDA regulations also create a legal requirement 
to uphold minimum standards in the Declaration of Helsinki.  See supra notes 39, 140-
45 (outlining the requirements of the Declaration of Helsinki and its acceptance by 
the FDA in foreign research). 
189 The forum non conveniens challenges faced by litigants attempting to use the 
ATS in the United States suggest wide applicability of the informed consent norm in 
foreign common law, with an indication that there are alternative fora in which these 
rights would be recognized.  See Jolyon Ford & George Tomossy, Clinical Trials in Devel-
oping Countries:  The Plaintiff’s Challenge, LAW, SOC. JUST. & GLOBAL DEV. § 3.3, June 4, 
2004, http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/2004_1/ford/ (discussing the 
factors a litigant may consider when bringing a lawsuit abroad rather than in the coun-
try where the clinical trial took place, but also noting the perceived corruptness of for-
eign tribunals).  The inadequacy of alternative forums, apart from corruption or pro-
cedural infirmities, does not negate legal recognition of claims; rather it supports the 
need for additional recognition in the U.S. legal system and, more specifically, in U.S. 
federal common law. 
190 See Kontorovich, supra note 12, at 115 (“The ‘door’ that Sosa leaves ‘ajar subject 
to vigilant doorkeeping’ has nothing behind it.” (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 
U.S. 692, 729 (2004))). 
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starting point of this expansive interpretation.191  Though the Court 
cautioned that the ATS was not intended to create a private right of 
action for any alleged violation of international law, the narrow hold-
ing of Sosa was this:  one cannot allege that any unauthorized deten-
tion of minimal duration rises to the level of concern which merits re-
covery under the ATS.  Certainly a more specific and more serious 
harm than this results from failure to obtain consent for the repeated 
intrusions upon one’s body that occur in the context of clinical re-
search.  The requirement for informed consent found in all identifi-
able discussions of research subjects protections evidences an interna-
tional demand for respect of this principle.  Informed consent in the 
conduct of clinical trials has unquestionably reached the status of cus-
tomary international law that is actionable under the ATS, as required 
by the “definable, universal and obligatory” standard of the Sosa 
Court.192  Well-defined principles of informed consent therefore pro-
vide a reasonable basis upon which to allege an actionable claim for 
recovery under the ATS when harm results from a failure to follow 
customary international law governing consent.  Even after Sosa, the 
specificity of such norms and the magnitude of their importance de-
mand nothing less. 
191 See supra Part II.B (detailing the holding in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 
(2d Cir. 1980), and its interpretation under Sosa). 
192 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004).  In its opinion, the Sosa 
Court also referred to the principles of international law from the Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law, which leave room for a finding of a customary international norm 
even when it is not unanimously agreed upon.  Id.  In notes to section 103 of the Re-
statement, commentators indicate that declarations of international organizations can 
also “provide important evidence of law,” adding that “[t]he evidentiary value of such a 
resolution is high if it is adopted by consensus or by virtually unanimous vote of an or-
ganization of universal membership such as the United Nations or its Specialized 
Agencies.”  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 103 reporter’s 
note 2 (1987) (adding weight to UN agreements such as the ICCPR that mandate con-
sent in clinical experimentation); see also Fidler, supra note 159, at 337 (asserting that 
the right to informed consent exists, despite some developing countries’ difficulties 
implementing it); Jonathan Todres, Can Research Subjects of Clinical Trials in Developing 
Countries Sue Physician-Investigators for Human Rights Violations?, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. 
RTS. 737, 740 (2000) (exploring viability of ATS claims in the pre-Sosa era).  But see 
Meier, supra note 40, at 535 & n.141 (contesting consistent applicability of the norm).  
With only one case under the ATS in the United States, this is an area ripe for a deci-
sive authority on the status of international law governing informed consent.  The in-
creasing recognition of the harms created by unchecked medical experimentation 
demands an official determination on accountability for violations, contrary to the po-
sition taken by the Southern District of New York in the Trovan Case.  See supra Part II.A 
(discussing the Trovan Case and its outcome). 
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D.  Nonsubstantive Considerations in ATS Litigation 
The Sosa decision is important because it clarifies the substantive 
requirements of an ATS action.  Beyond a determination of what con-
stitutes an actionable claim under the ATS, however, plaintiffs must 
successfully navigate several other components of ATS litigation:  the 
state action requirement, procedural barriers such as forum non con-
veniens and the political question doctrine, and evidentiary burdens.  
While this Comment will not attempt a comprehensive discussion of 
each element, they are briefly discussed here for completeness. 
1.  State Action Requirement 
State action is generally considered a prerequisite for any action 
under the ATS because the law of nations governs relations between 
nation-states.193  In litigating alleged violations of international law, 
plaintiffs may demonstrate state action through one of the traditional 
tests; alternatively, they may argue that the state action requirement 
should be suspended and that the statute should be applied to private 
actions so egregious that they demand a response.  Traditionally, 
courts have applied one of four tests when determining whether the 
state action requirement has been met.  In the “joint action test,” 
plaintiffs must demonstrate that the private actor acted “in concert” 
with the state.194  The “symbiotic relationship test” asks whether the 
state has “‘so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence’ 
with a private party that ‘it must be recognized as a joint participant in 
the challenged activity.’”195  The “nexus test” requires that the state 
have “significant involvement and actual participation” in the action 
of the private actor, such that it could no longer be considered private 
conduct.196  The fourth test, “public function,” asks whether the action 
typically is one reserved for the state.197  Based on these definitions, 
claimants bringing an action under the ATS for alleged violations of 
human subjects norms that require informed consent likely would be 
able to use the symbiotic, public function, and nexus tests to argue 
that state action has taken place. 
193 See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text (discussing the Sosa Court’s re-
statement of this interpretation of the law of nations). 
194 Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 379 (E.D. La. 1997). 
195 Id. at 378 (quoting Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 725 
(1961)). 
196 Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 377. 
197 Id. at 379. 
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Under the symbiotic test, analysis probably would proceed as fol-
lows:  because developing countries receive significant benefits from 
research conducted by private corporations, which bring needed 
medical services in the context of medical experimentation, foreign 
governments can become interdependent with the private actor.  In 
other words, foreign governments rely on researchers to fill an access 
gap,198 while researchers rely on foreign governments for speedy ac-
cess to data.  This interdependence often permits researchers to offer 
substandard care to human subjects, so long as the researchers remain 
in the foreign country to provide medical services to its population.199
Plaintiffs also could argue that the state action requirement is met 
through the public function test.  When conducting clinical trials in 
developing countries, researchers, who are private actors, become the 
means through which governments provide healthcare to their citi-
zens, especially during epidemics.  Managing the public’s health typi-
cally and traditionally is a function reserved for a state’s government 
and regulatory oversight.  As such, researchers’ provision of that care, 
where government has failed to do so, constitutes state action. 
As a third way to meet the state action requirement, plaintiffs 
should consider the FDA’s ethical requirements for foreign research 
as a potential route to satisfaction of the nexus test.200  The FDA re-
quirements serve as a representation made by the United States to 
other countries regarding the expected level of research subject pro-
tections.  These FDA requirements are relevant to a discussion of state 
action because the United States may develop a sufficiently close 
nexus with a private actor through that actor’s placement of a proto-
col through FDA channels prior to that actor’s departure to a foreign 
nation to conduct research.  If the FDA supervises the research, then 
it arguably has become a participant.  Even if the private actor chooses 
not to submit research under FDA supervision, the FDA nonetheless 
makes an official representation to other countries that the research 
will be conducted under a certain standard of care.  Either approach 
198 See supra note 28 (defining and discussing the “access gap”). 
199 See supra Part I.A-B (commenting on the reciprocal utility between private ac-
tors and developing countries that would support such interdependence); see also 
MACKLIN, supra note 19, at 6-13 (discussing the “unquestionable gains” of researchers 
and the health needs of developing countries as related factors that motivate research 
abroad).  See generally THE CONSTANT GARDENER, supra note 4 (depicting dramatically 
the idea that foreign governments often sanction, and even encourage, research on 
unknowing victims). 
200 See supra Part I.A (listing the expected ethical norms governing foreign re-
search used to support a new drug application under FDA regulations). 
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would seem to satisfy the traditional standards of the nexus test for 
state action. 
Alternatively, plaintiffs could argue that a finding of state action is 
not necessary, because the alleged conduct is so abhorrent that it war-
rants universal condemnation.  In Kadic v. Karadzic, a landmark case 
following Filartiga, the Second Circuit expanded liability under the 
ATS to nonstate actors, on the grounds that there is a “substantial 
body of law . . . that renders private individuals liable for some inter-
national law violations.”201  The court based its decision on Restatement 
provisions suggesting that actions of “universal concern” should be ac-
tionable.202
While Sosa limits the scope of the ATS, its holding with respect to 
the state action requirement does not substantively change existing 
law.  The deference of the Sosa Court to Restatement formulations gov-
erning international law suggests that the Court would agree that ac-
tions of “universal concern” would remain actionable.203  Informed 
consent falls into the category of actions considered to be of “univer-
sal concern.”204  “Certain crimes are simply so horrific that, since Nur-
emberg, they have been universally condemned.  The horror of World 
War II led to a consensus that no one—no nation, person, or other 
legal entity—should ever be allowed to commit such crimes with im-
punity again.”205  Beginning with the findings at Nuremberg,206 the re-
201 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995) (finding that genocide and torture by a private 
actor self-proclaimed as a state qualified under the ATS).  But see Tel-Oren v. Libyan 
Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (declining to extend liability to the Pales-
tine Liberation Organization (PLO) for various terrorist actions, including murder 
and torture). 
202 Kadic, 70 F.3d at 240 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS 
LAW §§ 404, 702) (“[I]nternational law . . . permits states to establish appropriate civil 
remedies (for offenses of ‘universal concern’) . . . such as tort actions authorized by 
the Alien Tort Act.”). 
203 See supra note 192 (discussing the Sosa Court’s reference to Restatement princi-
ples describing acts that are widely accepted as violations and are universally con-
demned). 
204 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 404 cmt. a (“Universal 
jurisdiction over the specified offenses is a result of universal condemnation of those 
activities and general interest in cooperating to suppress them, as reflected in widely 
accepted international agreements and resolutions of international organizations.”). 
205 Londis, supra note 87, at 167; see also supra notes 169-76 and accompanying text 
(noting that violations of informed consent are indisputably exploitative and univer-
sally condemned). 
206 See Fidler, supra note 159, at 337 (reaffirming the significance of the Nurem-
berg Code in ending the atrocities of WWII and establishing the “right to free con-
sent”). 
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quirement of informed consent has been consistently upheld and spe-
cifically applied.  Thus, even after Sosa, private actors would likely 
meet the state action exemption criteria necessary to be found liable 
under the ATS on these grounds. 
2.  Forum Non Conveniens 
The most discussed obstacle for those initiating an ATS action 
remains dismissal for forum non conveniens.  But plaintiffs from de-
veloping countries often lack a legitimate forum in which to litigate 
their claims.  International fora designed to protect human rights will 
not hear these claims.  “[E]ven if the norm requiring informed con-
sent to medical experimentation has some status and certain content 
under international law, its breach is likely to be unenforceable in [In-
ternational Human Rights Litigation (IHRL)] fora, since most viola-
tions will be by non-state actors.”207  Litigation under the ATS, how-
ever, will sometimes suspend this state action requirement.208  Despite 
the fact that the ATS provides a more viable option for recovery, 
claims brought in a United States court are often dismissed, thereby 
requiring the plaintiffs to demonstrate the lack of a suitable alterna-
tive forum in order to maintain their action.  The plaintiffs in the Tro-
van Case were twice dismissed on these grounds, with instructions to 
return only if they could not find adequate consideration of their 
claims in another forum.209  Nonetheless, courts will deem a forum in-
adequate only when it is “so clearly . . . unsatisfactory that it is no rem-
edy at all.”210  Plaintiffs may attempt to base the inadequacy of an al-
ternative forum on the grounds that the foreign forum is politically 
influenced to the point of corruption, lacks sufficient assets to afford 
an adequate remedy, or cannot provide an opportunity for fair judg-
207 Ford & Tomossy, supra note 189, § 3.2 (discussing the lack of suitable interna-
tional fora, which limits individuals’ claims to actions taken by a state).  Even if indi-
viduals can successfully argue the presence of state action, they still are unlikely to find 
suitable compensation via international human rights litigation fora, such as that pro-
vided by the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.  See id. (“[A]s only the state holds 
duties under the ICCPR, the action (under the First Optional Protocol) would not be 
useful against a corporate trial sponsor and would require that the subject’s own 
state . . . was sufficiently involved in the drug trial.”). 
208 See supra Part III.D.1 (outlining the state action requirement and its excep-
tions). 
209 See Trovan Case, No. 01 CIV 8118, 2005 WL 1870811 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 9, 2005), at 
*18 (conditioning the forum non conveniens dismissal on the expectation of action by 
the alternative forum in Nigeria). 
210 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 254 (1981). 
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ment because of the strong local presence of the defendant.211  Given 
the strong involvement of foreign governments in encouraging re-
search abroad, courts may be more willing to consider these argu-
ments when judging the adequacy of the alternative forum abroad.212
3.  Political Question Doctrine 
Courts’ recognition of the political question doctrine generates a 
second procedural obstacle for individuals seeking application of the 
ATS in United States courts.  If a court determines that the resolution 
of a case involves answering a political question, it will refuse to hear 
the case.  The U.S. Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr213 established the 
standard for judging whether a political question exists: 
A given suit may present a political question if:  (1) the matter is consti-
tutionally committed to a coordinate branch of government; (2) no “ju-
dicially discoverable and manageable standards” exist to guide the 
court’s analysis; (3) it is impossible to decide the case without making an 
initial policy determination that should rightfully be made by a separate 
branch; (4) deciding the case would express “a lack of respect” to a co-
ordinate branch of government; (5) there is “an unusual need for un-
questioning adherence to a political decision already made”; or (6) the 
potential embarrassment to the U.S. government could arise as a result 
of “multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one ques-
tion.”
214
The Kadic court announced that Filartiga essentially eliminated 
dismissal based on the first three standards by establishing judicially 
manageable standards with respect to international law.215  That court 
also stated that factors four through six presented a viable barrier 
“only if judicial resolution of a question would contradict prior deci-
sions taken by a political branch in those limited contexts where such 
contradiction would seriously interfere with important governmental 
interests.”216  Londis indicates that, in the ATS context, the “critical 
211 See Ford & Tomossy, supra note 189, § 3.3 (discussing these possibilities in the 
context of the Trovan Case). 
212 Indeed, in the Trovan Case, an initial dismissal on the grounds of forum non 
conveniens was remanded for consideration based on similar litigation which had not 
received an adequate response.  See Trovan Case, 2005 WL 1870811, at *5 (remanding 
for reconsideration of a suitable alternative forum). 
213 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
214 Londis, supra note 87, at 185-86 (summarizing the findings in Baker). 
215 See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 249 (2d Cir. 1995) (applying the holding of 
Filartiga to the first three factors of justiciability). 
216 Id. 
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inquiry involves whether a given ruling would upset, embarrass, or en-
rage a sovereign nation, or embarrass the executive by contradicting 
or undermining its foreign policy statements.”217  It would be difficult 
for a defendant to win dismissal on the basis of the political question 
doctrine because the executive branch vests authority in the FDA to 
determine the standards under which research should be con-
ducted.218  If these standards are violated, it cannot be contradictory 
for the executive to hold the violators accountable.  Similarly, the 
United States should not be concerned with upsetting a sovereign na-
tion by enforcing its own standards for foreign research. 
4.  Evidentiary Burdens 
The Sosa decision reinforces the notion that the ATS is a jurisdic-
tional statute with limited ability to create new federal common law.  
In addition to establishing jurisdiction, plaintiffs are still required to 
prove all elements of a traditional tort action to secure recovery.  The 
law of nations suffices to demonstrate the duty element of a prima fa-
cie tort claim.  A violation of the law of nations constitutes a breach of 
duty for the purposes of a tort action.  Plaintiffs also carry the burden 
of demonstrating the remaining tort elements of causation and dam-
ages.  Because of the general nature of international litigation, plain-
tiffs often face significant obstacles in meeting the evidentiary burden 
of demonstrating these two elements.219  While this should be an im-
portant concern for anyone attempting to litigate an ATS claim, plain-
tiffs involved in clinical trial litigation might find it slightly less diffi-
cult to obtain documentation that could establish the necessary 
elements to prove their case, given that companies who later wish to 
obtain approval for drug marketing in the United States will need to 
submit documentation related to their studies.220  Therefore, these 
217 Londis, supra note 87, at 186. 
218 See supra Part I (describing the FDA’s ethical expectations for its acceptance of 
foreign research). 
219 See Todres, supra note 192, at 759-66 (discussing difficulties relating to cultural 
differences and reasonable investigator duties that may preclude the ability to demon-
strate causation and damages).  Poor or nonexistent record keeping may also prove to 
be a significant evidentiary hurdle to demonstrating elements of a tort action.  See 
MACKLIN, supra note 19, at 100-01 (“[F]laws in procedural aspects—such as failure to 
keep proper records . . . —may not rise to the level of exploitation, [but] they are nev-
ertheless unethical features of research involving human subjects.”). 
220 See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text (discussing the interaction be-
tween the FDA and investigators conducting research in developing countries). 
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considerations should not alone discourage suits under the ATS for 
alleged human subjects abuses involving inadequate consent. 
CONCLUSION 
Human dignity and bodily integrity remain fundamental human 
rights.  These rights attain special meaning in the context of research 
involving human subjects, where the possibility of exploitation exists.  
Recognizing the potential vulnerability of human subjects, the inter-
national community goes further than forming broad aspirations 
about ethical conduct in research.  International law specifically con-
demns actions done in the name of medical experimentation that 
deny the individual’s rights to self-determination and to make a truly 
informed decision about what happens with her body.  However, in-
consistent or nonexistent enforcement of international norms govern-
ing research involving human subjects undermines their legitimacy.  
Creating accountability for violations of norms concerning human 
subjects research is imperative in an environment that favors the con-
tinued globalization of biomedical research.  The ATS, enacted to 
provide a location for adjudication of torts committed in violation of 
international law, provides a viable forum for recovery for those 
harmed in research conducted in violation of certain international 
norms.   
Past human subjects who become ATS litigants can surmount tra-
ditional barriers to recovery under this statute.  Reciprocal involve-
ment by both domestic and foreign governments in human subjects 
research practices provides a source of state action, although legal 
precedent suggests that private actors might also be found responsible 
for violations of research ethics, irrespective of whether plaintiffs can 
prove state action.  Because of the authority granted by the executive 
branch of the U.S. government to the FDA, the political question doc-
trine also is unlikely to create a significant barrier to ATS claims in 
U.S. courts.  Plaintiffs attempting an ATS action do face significant 
challenges due to evidentiary burdens and a tendency toward forum 
non conveniens determinations.  The former concern should not cre-
ate a barrier to entry into a U.S. court on an ATS claim, though it may 
impact the likelihood of success on the merits; the latter can be over-
come through the growing attention of the international community 
to the potential inadequacy of foreign tribunals that would otherwise 
hear these claims. 
TALATI PENNUMBRA.DOC 11/21/2006  7:01:59 PM 
278 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 231 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa seemingly presents the 
most significant obstacle to using the ATS to recover for alleged viola-
tion of ethical mandates concerning medical experimentation.  None-
theless, careful examination of the discrete holding in Sosa, and of the 
international nature of informed consent, demonstrates that Sosa 
would not restrict claims based specifically on inadequate consent to 
research.  Informed consent, in fact, offers the most basic of protec-
tions for human subjects involved in research; it is the mechanism by 
which investigators preserve a subject’s dignity and demonstrate re-
spect for the integrity of the human body.  Numerous doctrines of 
binding international law describe a right to informed consent, and 
scholars confirm this principle’s universal acceptance.  The mandate 
for informed consent in human experimentation raises this principle 
to the level of a customary international norm, which deserves recog-
nition under the federal common law—and correspondingly merits 
jurisdiction in U.S. courts under the ATS.  Thus, even after the restric-
tions placed on the ATS’s applicability following Sosa, this statute of-
fers a much needed solution for successful protection of human sub-
jects involved in medical experimentation.  Although Sosa leaves the 
door to recovery under the ATS only narrowly ajar, informed consent 
easily passes through. 
 
